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ABSTRACT
In recent years, courts and commentators have focused on the federalism-based
limits on the power of the federal government, with significantly less attention
given to similar constraints on state power. It is not surprising, therefore, that
both camps have overlooked that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, with their
reservation of both rights and power “to the people” contain a popular
sovereignty principle that affects the constitutionality of various state election law
regulations. This goal of this Article is to reaffirm that the people are, in essence,
part of the federalism equation, and not simply as protectors of state power, but as
sovereign entities in their own right.
This Article contends that the power that the people had to “alter or abolish” their
state governments following the Revolutionary War is the foundation of the right to
vote in state elections. The Founding generation considered the alter or abolish
power to be a natural right and an expression of popular sovereignty that followed
the people into the Union upon the ratification of the Constitution. Once this
power was circumscribed during the Civil War era, the people used the right to
vote as the vehicle to express this sovereign authority. Thus, voting, as the heir to
the alter or abolish power, is part of the bundle of participatory rights preserved
by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments’ reservation of “rights” and “power,”
respectively, to the people.
Given its genesis, these amendments provide a better conceptual foundation for the
right to vote in state elections than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Respect for its popular sovereignty foundations demand that the U.S.
Supreme Court, in assessing burdens on the right to vote, acknowledge the
reliance interest that the people retain in actively participating in the democratic
process at the state level, an interest preserved by the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. Both amendments illustrate the hybrid nature of suffrage as one part
sovereign power and one part fundamental right, which should influence the
judicial means-ends assessment of restrictions on the right to vote in state
elections.
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INTRODUCTION
The right to vote is a bundle of contradictions. The Supreme Court has framed it
as “preservative of all other rights,” explicitly holding that there is a constitutional
right to vote in federal elections.1 Yet the Court stops short of according the same
protection to the right to vote in state elections, even though the Constitution
explicitly links state voter qualifications to participation in federal elections.2 Part
of this confusion stems from the Court’s conception of voting as a right that
derives from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, holding
that states can choose whether to extend the right, but once available, it has to be
extended on equal terms.3 This Article illustrates that voting in state elections is
better understood, not as an equal protection fundamental interest subject to
retraction at will,4 but as the centerpiece of a bundle of participatory rights that
citizens used during the Founding era to directly influence and participate in
government at the state level. While scholars have acknowledged the connection
between voting and popular sovereignty,5 none have properly conceptualized it as
the rightful heir of the power that the people had to “alter or abolish” their state

1

Harper v. State Bd. of Elec. See also Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elec., 360
U.S. 45, 51 (1959) (inferring from various provisions of the Constitution that “the right of
suffrage is established and guaranteed” for federal elections but noting that the substance of
the right is “established by the laws and Constitution of the State”).
2
Id. See James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community, and the Constitutional Structure of
Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 893, 894
(“In a contradiction unparalleled in constitutional law, the Court has said both that the
Constitution ‘undeniably’ protects the right to vote in state and federal elections and that
that the right to vote ‘is not a constitutionally protected right.’”).
3
14th Am; Harper
4
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 114 (1973) (“The right
to vote in federal elections is conferred by Art. I, § 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment of
the Constitution, and access to the state franchise has been afforded special protection
because it is ‘preservative of other basic civil and political rights’”). Commentators have
criticized the equal protection conception of voting, but still treats right to vote as identical
in state in federal elections. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Voting Rights and the Third
Reconstruction, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 159, 164-65 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B.
Siegel, eds., 2009).
5
See, e.g., Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness
As a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 301,
315 (1991) (arguing that voting is “a means to affirm the philosophy of popular
sovereignty”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 487-94 (1994); Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres,
Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance (2002). See also Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (linking an equally weighted vote directly to the principle of
popular sovereignty).
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governments following the Revolutionary War.6 After the Civil War, the power to
alter or abolish state government was domesticized, as the Reconstruction era
rejected the violence inherent in the right due to its role in southern secession, and
transitioned to more peaceful expressions of this authority by implementing a more
robust right to vote in state constitutions.
The thesis of this Article is that the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of “rights to
the People” can provide an interpretive framework for understanding the sovereign
power “not delegated to the United States” and “reserved… to the people” in the
Tenth Amendment, 7 power that found its expression, first through the “alter or
abolish” provisions in state constitutions, and later through the exercise of specific
political rights including, most importantly, the right to vote.8 Because the right to
vote derives from the people’s sovereign authority to “alter or abolish” their
governments at the Founding, 9 a power that was not delegated to the federal
government upon ratification, both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments illustrate the
hybrid nature of voting as a “power-right,” or one part sovereign power and one
part fundamental right.10 This framework is reducible to general principles that
6

Many state constitutions adopted in the post-Revolutionary era had alter or abolish
provisions, which bestowed in people the inalienable right to change or dismantle their
state governments at any time.
7
U.S. Const. amend. X. Some scholars associate the “alter or abolish” authority with
the Ninth Amendment, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights (describing the power of
the people to alter or abolish their governments as “the most obvious and inalienable right
underlying the Ninth Amendment”), but arguably, it is better conceptualized as both a
natural right to abolish government and a means by which voters express their sovereign
power since this authority could be exercised outside of the confines of government
institutions. See Fritz, supra note , at 24 (noting that people were not bound by “existing
procedures for change in the Constitution” in exercising the alter or abolish authority).
8
The argument that the Ninth Amendment can serve as an interpretive framework for
understanding the powers preserved by the Tenth Amendment is a view commonly
associated with Kurt Lash. See Lash, supra note , at 410 (“The Tenth declares the principle
of enumerated federal power. The Ninth controls the interpretation of those powers. In
situations where Congress has implausibly extended its enumerated powers, this would call
into play both Amendments: the Ninth, as establishing the proper rule of construction, and
the Tenth, as prohibiting the exercise of any power not fairly attributable to an enumerated
power.”).
9
See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 722 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Ninth Amendment is the source of the constitutional right to vote in state
elections).
10
See generally James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing
Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 189, 203 ( )
(referring to elections in a republican government as “a limited or specialized act of
sovereign choice designating a particular individual to exercise specific government
powers as the people’s agent”). See also Vikram David Amar and Alan Brownstein, The
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courts can employ in assessing the means/ends fit of state election regulations that
affect voting rights, and it protects the reliance interest that the people have had,
since at least Civil War era, in using suffrage as a means to express their sovereign
will.
In critiquing the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, the legal scholarship has
ignored the link between voting and state alter or abolish provisions, leading to
undertheorized conceptions of the right that do not protect voting rights any more
than the Court’s flawed version of the right. Much of the scholarly confusion
stems from the failure to give meaning to one simple word: “or.” The Tenth
Amendment in its entirety provides that, “The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
states respectively, or to the people.”11 The use of the word “or” in the phrase
“reserved to the states respectively, or the people” strongly suggests that the people
have reserve power that is independent of the powers retained by the state, a
possibility that has been ignored because of the state-centered view of the Tenth
Amendment that has dominated the legal scholarship.12 Questions arise about how
to translate this power into judicially accessible principles that can protect and give
substance to this sovereign authority that the people retain under the Tenth
Amendment. The Ninth Amendment, 13 with its acknowledgement of “certain
rights…retained by the People,” 14 arguably provides a workable framework for the
Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 915, 925 (1999) (“Voting is about the
exercise of power. It operates as the mechanism through which popular sovereignty directs
the actions of the government.”).
11
12

Cf. Lash, supra note at 391-395 (interpreting the retained rights of the people and the
autonomy of the states collectively instead of separately). See also Lash, supra note , at 31,
33 (arguing that “Madison…equated the retained rights of the states with the collective
interests of the ‘local’ people” because the people retained the ability to replace their
representatives at the next election cycle but there are also “numerous references to
retained individual rights”). The trend in the legal scholarship has been to conflate the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments because both stand for the principle that the powers not
delegated to the federal government have been reserved, see Randy Barnett, “James
Madison’s Ninth Amendment,” in The Rights Retained by the People 8 (1989) (criticizing
this approach), but this does not mean that the Tenth Amendment should have no bearing
on what rights are retained by the People under the Ninth Amendment, given that both
reference the People. See Lash, supra note , at 75 (arguing that the term “shall not be
construed” in the Ninth Amendment shows that its “sole textual function is control the
interpretation of other provisions,” notably the Tenth).
13
The Ninth Amendment states, “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the People.” U.S. Const.
amend. IX.
14
Most interpretations of the Ninth and Tenth Amendment view them as constraining
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sovereign power that the people retain; in fact, many scholars have argued that the
Ninth Amendment is the source of the right of the people to alter or abolish
government, making it the natural home of the right’s predecessor, the right to
vote.
Indeed, the popular sovereignty origins of the right to vote are part of a broader
tradition of “practical” sovereignty which was, during the revolutionary period,
“the principle of the power of the people to destroy the constitution they created,”15
and this power to alter or abolish later provided the theoretical basis for
fundamental law premised on the consent of the govern.16 The right of revolution
that justified the colonists’ rebellion against Britain in 1776 evolved from a right to
alter or abolish government through sometimes violent means to enforcing
fundamental law against “errant rulers” through the exercise of political rights,
including the rights of petition, assembly, speech, and, most important, the right to
vote.17 The Civil War era cemented the evolution of this power from one focused
only the federal government. Indeed, one way around this, embraced by some scholars, is
to argue that the Ninth Amendment rights constrain the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the
Quiet Ninth Amendment: Determining Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive
Due Process, 32 U. Balt. L. Rev. 169 (2003). See also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting that the Ninth itself does not apply against the states, but
that the Fourteenth protects the same set of retained rights). This Article does not embrace
the incorporation argument because it obscures the nature of the rights that the Article
seeks to protect—those based on the sovereign authority embraced by the Tenth
Amendment that owe their existence to the character of state governments at the time of the
Founding (rather than at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment). See also Lash, supra
note , at 245 (rejecting incorporation of the Ninth through the Fourteenth Amendment).
15
Fritz, supra note , at 279. See Lash, supra note , at 341 (“Scholars have identified the
term “the people,” as used in the Bill of Rights and in the Preamble of the Constitution, as
an expression of popular sovereignty - the idea that ultimate authority is retained by the
people who may alter or abolish their system of government as they see fit.”).
16
Kramer, supra note , at 11-13. See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the
Governed, Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 483
(describing popular sovereignty as a concept that has historically been based on majority
rule). While the notion of who “the people” are has changed over the course of the last two
centuries, see U.S. Const. amend. XV, IXX, XXVI, the idea that “the people” should have
the ability to participate in the mechanics of state government, primarily through voting, to
a much greater extent than at the federal level has changed very little during this time. See
Part II, infra. See also ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE (2000). Keyssar notes
that “all of the early state constitutions (except that of Delaware) treated the right to vote as
a matter of fundamental—and thus constitutional—law, rather than statute law”, id. at 20,
while “citizenship in the new nation – controlled by the federal government – was divorced
from the right to vote.” Id. at 24.
17
Kramer, supra note , at 25 (“The community itself had both a right and a
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on violent overthrow to the belief that the legitimacy of government is determined
by periodic elections that are an accurate gauge of public sentiment.18 The Ninth
and Tenth Amendments incorporated these majoritarian sentiments, protecting
those rights and powers of the people that were central to their status as the
ultimate sovereigns. 19 Given these populist origins, voting as a power-right,
although a federal constitutional guarantee, is defined primarily by state
constitutional law and applies against both the states and the federal government.20

responsibility to act when the ordinary legal process failed, and unconstitutional laws could
be resisted by community members…Means of correction and forms of resistance were
well-established and highly structured. First and foremost, was the right to vote…Next in
importance, though perhaps not effectiveness, was the right to petition, together with what
became its corollary, the newly emerging right of assembly.”). See also Fritz, supra note ,
at 281 (noting that his concept of collective sovereign and Kramer’s theory of popular
constitutionalism “are not synonymous” because “[p]opular constitutionalism involves
actions to interpret and enforce the constitution” and “the idea of [the people as] a
collective sovereign is a broader foundational principle that justified the creation, revision,
and even the destruction of constitutions”). As Part II shows, theories of collective
sovereignty as a justification for constitutional change became less popular because of the
violence inherent in the theory’s view that people could “destroy” constitutions, and
popular sovereignty through the exercise of political rights became an important
replacement that arguably, as Part III illustrates, affected the Constitution’s protection of
these rights. See id. at 281 (noting that “popular constitutionalism comes into play only
when a constitution already exists” and its “effectiveness against official action stems from
its exertion of political pressure rather than from a recognition that government is the agent
of the people”).
18
Keyssar, supra note , at 24 (stating that the “experience of the revolution—the
political and military trauma of breaking with a sovereign power, fighting a war, and
creating a new state—served to crack the ideological framework that had upheld and
justified a limited suffrage”)
19
20

[cite to old supreme ct precedent treating state power as plenary in this area]
Textually, it is not clear that the Tenth Amendment has to be read to limit only the powers
of the federal government, although such a view may be ahistorical. See footnote infra.
Nonetheless, the Ninth Amendment does not have to be read in such a limited manner
because, unlike the Tenth Amendment, it is not overly burdened by precedent. See United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); See also Massey, supra note at 1248. As
Massey notes, the Ninth Amendment has not been incorporated against the states through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because “at least at this point in our
constitutional history, there is thought to be virtually nothing to incorporate.” Id. Massey
argues, however, that “because ninth amendment rights originate in and derive substance
from state constitutional law they also apply to the state of origin through the constitution
of the state.” Id. See also Lash, supra note , at 248-267 (reconciling the Ninth Amendment
with the Fourteenth Amendment).
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This framework is consistent with the framers’ expectations that state, rather than
federal, law would be the source of the right to vote.21
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I shows that the equal protection
conception of the right to vote is erroneous and does not account for the reliance
interest that people have in participating in governance at the state level, which is
central to understanding how voting is a “power-right” that furthers the people’s
use of their sovereign authority.22 Equal protection wrongly presents the right to
vote is permissive in state elections, subject to retraction by state authorities as
they see fit, or as it applies to both state and federal elections, subject to extensive
and restrictive regulation at the hands of state authorities.23 In reality, the only
context in which the Constitution allows states to retract the right to vote is for
presidential elections,24 and its popular sovereignty foundations suggest that the
right is mandatory for all other state and federal elections.25 Part II engages in a
historical analysis that supports this point, illustrating that, while the rights that
people retain against the federal government are necessarily mitigated by the
compromises in the text and structure that impose representative government,26 the
Republican Form of Government Clause of Article IV (“the Guarantee Clause”)
mandates only that republicanism serve as a floor, rather than a ceiling, on the type
of government that can be adopted at the state level.27 As a result, states have,
since the Founding, opted for governments that are significantly more
“democratic” than that which exists at the federal level, with the people directly
electing almost all of their state officials; and later, enjoying an explicit right to
21

See, e.g., Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 790 (1995) (discussing “a proposal made by the
Committee of Detail that would have given Congress the power to add property
qualifications” which was rejected because James Madison argued that “such a power
would vest ‘an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature,’ by which the Legislature
‘can by degrees subvert the Constitution.’ ”) (certain internal quotations marks omitted)
(quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 533–34 (1969)).
22
All states had some variation of the right to vote during the colonial period, the
scope of which expanded throughout the Founding era and varied by location. See Keyssar,
supra note , at 8-21. The right to vote and the burdens that states place on the right also
have evolved such that comparisons will have to be drawn. There may not be a popular
sovereignty right to participate in early voting, for example, but if the state provided early
voting and then rescinded it, the Court would take the popular sovereignty principle into
account
and
closely
scrutinize
the
state’s
reasons.
Cf.
http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/arizona/capitol_media_services/article_8a05991e-7f0411e3-8a04-001a4bcf887a.html.
23
See Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections
24
See U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 1.
25
See
26
See John Manning, the Generality Problem in Constitutional Law
27
See Part I, infra.
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vote and participating directly in lawmaking through initiatives and referenda
under virtually all state constitutions. 28 Given the choice of democracy as a
foundational principle at the state level and, moreover, that the constitutional
standard for who can be a “voter” in both state and federal elections is derived
primarily from state law,29 part III makes the normative claim that consideration of
the popular sovereignty origins of the right to vote require that courts credit the
reliance interest that voters had in the preexisting regime that governed their state’s
election apparatus. Where the contested state regulation constricts the right to vote
compared to the preexisting rule, then the Court should apply heightened
scrutiny. 30 Thus, the balancing test derived from Anderson v. Celebrezze, 31
Burdick v. Takushi, 32 and Crawford v. Marion County 33 that the Court has
employed to assess both direct and indirect restrictions on the right to vote has to
be reformulated to replace the Court’s blind deference to state authorities with a
framework that assesses regulations from the baseline of both the states’
considerable authority to regulate the electoral arena and the rights of participation
that voters retain to participate in state level governance, rights that find their
expression through the right to vote.34
28

See, e.g., Minor v. Happerset, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (“It is true that the United States
guarantees to every State a republican form of government…The guaranty necessarily
implies a duty on the part of the States themselves to provide such a government. All the
States had governments when the Constitution was adopted. In all the people participated
to some extent, through their representatives elected in the manner specifically provided.
These governments the Constitution did not change. They were accepted precisely as they
were, and it is, therefore, to be presumed that they were such as it was the duty of the States
to provide. Thus we have unmistakable evidence of what was republican in form, within
the meaning of that term as employed in the Constitution.”). See also Josh Douglas, The
Right to Vote Under State Constitutions
29
See Wiecek, supra note 18-19 (“Democracy, referring to a distinctive form of
government, meant the direct, complete, and continuing control of the legislative and
executive branches by the people as a whole…all but extreme conservatives by 1787
conceded that a ‘democratic element’ was essential or at least unavoidable in the
composition of state governments.”). See also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona
30
This is similar to the nonretrogression analysis that the Court used to apply in cases
brought under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
31
32

(cite). See also Anderson v. Celebrezze.

33
34

In determining the means-ends fit, the Court would utilize principles similar to those
embodied by the nonretrogression analysis of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which
captures the historical reality that voters have a reliance interest in broad participation in
the mechanics of state level governance, and states have to come forward with compelling
reasons for changing a rule if voters are worse off under the new rule. (cite cases). For
example, as the analysis in Part III(B) shows, states have considerable authority to pass
voter identification laws, but these laws can be unconstitutional if structured to
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I. REVISITING THE EQUAL PROTECTION ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
Until recently, commentators had taken as a given that the right to vote derived
from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and were content
with its dubious origins because the Court was willing to assess infringements of
the right under strict scrutiny. 35 This support has proven to be fatal as the
conception of the right to vote as an equal protection fundamental interest, rather
than as a fundamental right under related doctrines such as substantive due
process, 36 provided an opening for the Court to reduce its scrutiny of laws
infringing on the right. As this section will show, the equal protection principles
underlying the Supreme Court’s voting jurisprudence are best applicable to
presidential elections; when applied in other contexts, the Court oscillates between
different conceptions of the right to vote because it lacks a clear theoretical
foundation for understanding the value of a vote.37
Scholars have grouped the Court’s approach into individual and structuralist
theories of the right to vote in an attempt to understand the harm to individual
voters and, in the process, illustrate the ill fit of the equal protection framework.38
Here, I focus on two related theories—communitarian and protective theories of
democracy—both of which do an excellent job of explaining the Court’s
jurisprudence in the last four decades, but only one of which, the protective
democracy theory, highlights the problems with the equal protection framework by

unreasonably constrict the electorate and leave voters worse off. See also Barnett, supra
note , at 11-16 (embracing a power-constraining approach to interpreting the Ninth
Amendment in which courts interpret unenumerated rights by reference to the means-ends
fit of the legislation in question rather than as the converse of delegated powers).
35
79 NCL Rev. 1345
36
Ira Lupo
37
See Dan Rodriguez, Got Theory? See also Rick Pildes, What Kind of Right is “The
Right To Vote”?, 93 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 43, 44 (2007) (“Not only does the right to vote
protect several different core interests, but these interests are also qualitatively distinct. Put
in other terms, there is not one right to vote. There is several.”)
38
See Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 Ind. L.J.
1289, 1292 (arguing that the individual rights framework is appropriate for assessing the
new vote denial cases, which deal with issues of who can vote rather than questions of how
to aggregate votes to ensure fairness and equality among groups). See also Richard L.
Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equality from Baker v. Carr to Bush
v. Gore 139, 154 (2003) (rejecting a structuralist approach to voting rights cases); Chad
Flanders, How to Think About Voter Fraud (And Why), 41 Creighton L. Rev. 93, 150
n.138 (2007) (siding with the “individualist” rather than the “structuralist” analysis of voter
fraud controversies).
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placing voting within the larger scheme of democratic governance,39 emphasizing
the accountability of elected officials that is key is to the right to vote being able to
function as a mechanism for popular sovereignty.40 Similar in some respects to
aspects of the structuralists critique, theories of protective democracy
conceptualize voting as a means to allow the citizenry to control the actions of
their government when key liberties are threatened, and as a result, is closely
related to the exercise of popular sovereignty.41 But the assessment is significantly
39

See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86
Ind. L.J. 1289, 1292 (“The individual-rights- versus-state-interests doctrinal framework
plainly was not capturing the real interests at stake on both sides of these cases.
Structuralist scholars urged the Court to reorient its jurisprudence toward promoting the
interests of the whole polity, framed in terms of democratic values: competitiveness,
participation, “democratic contestation,” the disruption of “lockups,” and other indicia of a
healthy democratic order.”)
40
See also Pildes, supra note , at 44 (arguing that the individualistic vs. group rights
analysis should not be the starting point, but instead scholars should focus on the fact that
“the right to vote protects several distinct interests [including] the expressive interest in
equal protection standing that inheres to each citizen [as well as] the interests groups of
citizens have in systems of election and representation that distribute political power
‘fairly’ or ‘appropriately’ as between these various groups”). There is a robust literature
debating the shortcomings of the individual rights framework for conceptualizing the right
to vote. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel Charles; Joseph Fishkin; Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S.
Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 2276,
2282 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American
Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. Chi. Legal F. 83, 84; Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson,
Why Voting Is Different, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1201, 1202-03 (1996); Pildes, supra note 19, at
2544 n.133; Judith Reed, Sense and Nonsense: Standing in the Racial Districting Cases as a
Window on the Supreme Court's View of the Right to Vote, 4 Mich. J. Race & L. 389, 43240 (1999); John R. Low-Beer, Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional
Representation, 94 Yale L.J. 163, 164 (1984). But see Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v.
Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, 26 Rutgers L.J. 723, 734-35 (1995). See generally
Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term - Comment: Eracing Democracy: The
Voting Rights Cases, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 109 (1994). Implicit in this debate is that the
framework is inadequate for federal elections since as Heather Gerken has argued,
representative government is premised on the assumption that “individuals can collaborate
to elect a person to speak on their behalf.” Gerken, supra note , at 1678. There are
different assumptions that undergird the right to vote in the state elections, where voters are
directly involved in matters of governance and the accountability function of elections is
salient. See Part II, infra.
41
This discussion of protective and communitarian theories of voting builds on a
wonderful article written by Jim Gardner, who persuasively illustrates how these theories
apply to the Court’s conception of the right to vote. See Gardner, supra note , at 901-02
(“to seek to vote under…a theory [of protective democracy] is to seek the ability to protect
one’s liberty by controlling the identity of officeholders and, indirectly, their actions”).
There are a number of democratic theories that could provide a framework for
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more pluralistic than that offered by structuralists because while it does not ignore
the bottom line metrics such as the decline of competition, turnout, and overall
levels of participation that drive the structuralist critique, these metrics are not
dispositive. 42 Instead, this approach highlights the instrumental value of voting as
a means of holding elected officials accountable to the sovereign authority of the
people, but it does so from the baseline of assessing the levels of participation that
the people have historically enjoyed in the state.43 It provides historical context for
understanding when measures are truly “anti-democratic.” In contrast, theories of
communitarian democracy contend that voting as important because “it is the
hallmark of full membership in the political community,” and this approach
focuses on the message conveyed by extending or retracting voting rights from
certain individuals.44
The Court has fluctuated between these two theories because it has treated voting
as both a right and a privilege, with cases decided in the 1960s as the high water
mark for voting’s conception as a right, but subsequent decades seeing a retraction
of the right.45 In 1966, the Court decided Harper v. Board of Elections and held
that voting is a fundamental interest under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and as such, once the right to vote is extended, then it
must be extended equally.46 Harper struck down a poll tax on the grounds that

understanding the right to vote in state elections. See, e.g., David Held, Models of
Democracy; C.B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy; Cass R.
Sunstein, The Partial Constitution; James Fishkin, Deliberation by the People Themselves:
Entry Points for the Public Voice, 12 Election L.J. 490, 490, (2014); Lani Guiner, More
Democracy, 1995 U.Chi. L. Forum 1. While a robust right to vote is certainly consistent
with most of these theories, protective democracy accords best with the popular
sovereignty origins of the right because it captures its unique status as one part right and
one part power.
42
Cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New
Pressures for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 Hastings Const. L.Q. 643, 67577 (2008); Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 631, 634, 657-58
(2007).
43
See Part II, infra.
44
Id. at 902. This is not “expressiveness” in the sense of voters using the ballot to
communicate a message. See Burdick v. Takushi; Doe v. Reed. It is expressive in the
message that is sent to the broader community about denying some residents access to the
ballot.
45
See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (noting that there is “no litmuspaper test for separating those restrictions that are valid from that there are invidious under
the Equal Protection Clause…Decisions in this context…is very much a matter of degree,
very much a matter of considering the facts and circumstances behind the law…”).
46
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), overruling
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
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invidiously discriminated on the basis of wealth, marking a notable departure from
a case decided just seven years earlier, Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of
Elections, where the Court applied rational basis review to a state law requiring all
individuals take a literacy test as a prerequisite to voting. 47 Similarly, Reynolds v.
Sims established that the states’ failure to reapportion their state legislative districts
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
malapportionment, like the poll tax at issue in Harper, unduly infringed the right to
vote. In so holding, the Court noted that, “the fundamental principle of
representative government in this country is one of equal representation for equal
numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of
residence within a State.” 48 The Court then adopted a principle designed to
prevent the vote dilution that had persisted through the states’ failure to redistrict:
one person, one vote.49 Both Harper and Reynolds presented opportunities for the
Court to intervene and address what it considered to be egregious abridgments of
the right to vote. These extremes did not require the Court to establish a baseline
from which to adjudge the harm of malapportionment, 50 or alternatively, an
affirmative vision of state regulatory authority over elections.51
Consequently, neither Harper nor Reynolds stand for the proposition that the right
to vote in state elections has to exist, even if the corresponding right to vote in
federal elections must exist.52 Rather, the Court focused on what the Constitution
47

360 U.S. 45 (1959).
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 660-561.
49
Id. at 569 (“We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection
Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be
apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an individual's right to vote for state
legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted
when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.”).
50
See, e.g., Dean Alfange, Jr., Gerrymandering and the Constitution: Into the Thorns
of the Thicket, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 191 (1986) (observing that “it was the gerrymander
[emerging through malapportionment] that led the Court to respond, not the population
discrepancies in and of themselves. Had those discrepancies been random, operating to the
detriment of rural interests and to the advantage of urban interests as often as the other way
around, it is unlikely that these discrepancies would have generated sufficient concern to
have induced the Court to enter the political thicket”).
51
See Lassiter, 360 U.S. at (“We do not suggest that any standards which a State
desires to adopt may be required of voters,” but noting that “there is wide scope for
exercise of its jurisdiction”).
52
Id. (“While the right to vote in federal elections is conferred by Art. I, § 2, of the
Constitution, the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned. It is
argued that the right to vote in state elections is implicit, particularly by reason of the First
Amendment and that it may not constitutionally be conditioned upon the payment of a tax
or a fee. We do not stop to canvass the relation between voting and political expression.”).
48
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requires should states decide to extend the right of suffrage, a focus that ultimately
did more harm than good as the Court has decreased its level of scrutiny of voting
regulations in the years since Harper.53 Numerous scholars have criticized this
turn, noting that the equal protection standard allows the Court to avoid the
question of what voting requires.54 This standard also blurs the line between state
and federal elections, which impacts not only the breadth of the state’s regulatory
authority but also, conceptually, whether the right is mandatory or optional for
state elections.55 The Court focuses on the relative burdens on the right to vote,
defined by reference to community norms regarding political influence, against the
backdrop that states enjoy plenary authority to structure state and federal elections,
and it does so without a theoretical justification that adequately explains why any
given regulation can be a “burden” because it has no affirmative theory of voting.56
The absence of theory is palpable once one separates out the instrumental value of
voting, which varies depending on the election at issue. Given the size of the
electorate in national elections, the vision of voting as based on a message of
inclusion rather than a form of accountability is more compelling because the
accountability function is diluted.57 At the state level, however, voting is the most
effective way for citizens to express their sovereign authority, and in turn, protect
their fundamental rights, from government invasion, consistent with the theory of
protective democracy. As James Gardner has argued, a right to vote premised on
this theory forces the Court to commit to a finite and clear conception of the right
53

See Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of “Equal Protection of the Laws,”
1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 421, 450 (“The equal protection clause was clearly not intended to
include the right to vote.”).
54
See, e.g., Heather Gerken, The Right to An Undiluted Vote
55
See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona (holding that the National Voter
Registration Act, passed under the Elections Clause, preempts a contrary state law, but
noting in passing that Congress has no control over voter qualifications for state or federal
elections).
56
Gardner, supra note , at 900 (noting that “[v]oting has no intrinsic value”). See also
Ira Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 981
(1979).
57
In our 200 plus years history, there have only been four presidential elections
decided by a margin of less than one percent of the popular vote. In state elections, this is
far more common. See, e.g., http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/government-hasto-make-voting-easier/2014/02/02/ae99345a-8875-11e3-916e-e01534b1e132_story.html.
While this Article focuses on the accountability function of voting, this does not exclude
the fact that there are other reasons why people vote. See Fishkin, supra note , at 1336,
1355 (eschewing the “rational choice model of [of voting that focuses on] one’s impact on
an election outcome” in favor of a theory of voting that emphasizes the “dignity inhering in
the idea that my vote counts just as yours counts-that I am, with respect to the right to vote,
your equal.”).
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to vote, hence its awkward turn to the Equal Protection Clause.58 Harper and
Reynolds are cases that embrace a protective democracy theory of voting, designed
to facilitate popular sovereignty by eliminating effective barriers to voting, yet it is
the communitarian vision that has come to dominate the caselaw.59 For example,
in Kramer v. Union Free School District, the Court held that the a childless
stockbroker who lived with his parents could not be excluded from school board
elections because the state had failed to tailor the statute to avoid unduly narrowing
the scope of the relevant political community.60 To vote in school elections in that
particular district, the statute required that individuals 1) own or lease taxable real
estate in the district or 2) have children who are enrolled in district schools. The
Court found that the state had not, with any precision, limited the franchise to those
“directly affected” or “primarily interested” in the school elections because the
statute allowed many people who had, at best, a remote interest to vote in the
elections at the expense of excluding “interested and informed residents.”61
Scholars view Kramer as an extension of Harper’s strong conception of the right
to vote as a fundamental interest,62 indicating that it too may have a foundation in
protective democracy; nonetheless, it is difficult to view the plaintiff, Kramer, as
suffering harm in the traditional sense given that he has no children and no taxable
property in the district in which he desires vote. His interest is fairly remote, but
implicit in the opinion is that his “injury” is an expressive one, an indication to
outsiders that he had been excluded from the political community unfairly, in lieu
of other, less interested persons who could vote in the school board elections.63
Thus, Kramer is best understood as reflecting a communitarian view of the right to
vote, which trumps the protective democracy theory in this instance because of the
inherent flexibility of the equal protection standard in assessing relative burdens.64
58

Gardner, supra note , at 941 (“the inherent logic of a protective democracy-based
voting rights claim forces the Court to do something that it has never wanted to do: commit
itself to the principle that the Constitution creates a definite, judicially discernible structure
for the exercise of popular political power. The reasons the Court has historically given for
wanting to avoid this task go to its view of its own competence. Another reason, however,
may well be that the Court wishes to avoid publicly pronouncing the unappealing
conclusion that the Constitution provides Americans with a level of political influence that
is not merely minimal, but unacceptable by contemporary standards of democratic selfgovernment.”).
59
Gardner, supra note , at 975.
60
395 U.S. 621 (1968) (“Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may
participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the
legitimacy of representative government.”).
61
Id. at 633.
62
63
64

Gardner, supra note , at (arguing that, because of the equal protection framework,
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The judicial focus on the right to vote as an indicator of political inclusion, rather
than as a means of vindicating sovereign power, does little to explain why one
regulation may be a burden on the right to vote relative to others.65
To understand this point, consider Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, where the
Court held that individuals who resided in the police jurisdiction of Tuscaloosa,
and therefore were subject to Tuscaloosa’s police and sanitary regulations, were
properly excluded from voting in municipal elections because they lived outside
city boundaries. 66 The Court held that this was not disenfranchisement in any
meaningful sense because the plaintiffs, although affected by the extraterritorial
effect of municipal regulations, did not have a direct interest in participating in the
elections since they did not physically reside in the Tuscaloosa’s geographical
boundaries.67 Oddly, the Court’s sees voting in this context as instrumental, but in
a very limited sense, where the only function of voting is to promote the political
interests of those who are informed or directly affected, with very narrow view of
who fits in either category.68 The expressive, communitarian notion of voting, so
central to Kramer, is still relevant in Holt but it commanded a different outcome
due to the narrowness with which the Court defined the political community. The
Court did not think that the exclusion of these voters sent any particular message
since they are already excluded from the political community by virtue of
geography. The Court makes this assumption, even though the residents of Holt
are subject to Tuscaloosa’s police and sanitary regulations, and arguably suffered
more concrete injury than the 31-year-old childless stockbroker. 69 Had it
recognized the right’s popular sovereignty foundations, the Court would have
the Court has been more receptive to claims of voting that are communitarian rather than
based on protective democracy).
65
Gardner (paren about baseline)
66
439 U.S. 60 (1978)
67
Id. at 68-69.
68
Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 330 (describing the Court’s “instrumental
power” approach in voting cases which “allows states to disenfranchise in order to promote
an “intelligent” electorate or to insure that voters have a direct stake (or “interest”) in the
outcome. The underlying basis for such distinctions, while never explicitly articulated, is a
notion that those who fail to meet the qualifications cannot define with specificity their
policy choices in a rational and informed way and pursue such choices through voting”).
69
See Gardner, supra note , at 912 (“Compared to the plaintiffs in Holt, the plaintiff in
Kramer had a far less plausible claim that his inability to vote impaired in any significant
way his ability to protect his rights and liberties from government infringement. The
residents of Holt were subject to all manner of laws, including criminal and traffic offenses,
made by Tuscaloosa officials. As a result, any claim by Kramer based on a theory of
protective democracy would have had to rely on a far more attenuated connection between
the actions of the school board and the plaintiff’s rights and interests than existed in
Holt.”).
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appreciated that the burden on Holt residents had little to do with geography. The
harm resulted from the deprivation of sovereign authority, which requires that the
delegation of power to Tuscaloosa be contingent upon those subject to its laws
retaining the right to vote as an accountability mechanism, even if those
individuals reside outside city boundaries. 70 Instead, the equal protection
framework allowed the Court to rely on its own subjective perception of what
constituted a burden, a result that often prioritizes the communitarian theory of the
right to vote over the protective democracy view.71
Despite the Court’s theoretical shortcomings, there is a role for equal protection
principles to play in assessing the constitutionality of state electoral regulations.
Implicit in the equal protection standard is the notion that the right to vote can be
rescinded, a point that is consistent with communitarian notions that the value of
the vote lies, not in its instrumental value, but in its signal that one is part of the
political community. 72 If the right is rescinded from everyone, then no one is
“excluded” and therefore suffers a cognizable injury. 73 Moreover, if one looks at
the history and the text of the Constitution, the only context in which the right to
vote explicitly can be rescinded is in presidential elections, suggesting that its
conception as an equal protection fundamental interest should be limited to that
context.
Bush v. Gore, which ended the Florida recount in the 2000 presidential election on
equal protection grounds, is instructive here.74 The Florida Supreme Court had
ordered a manual recount in all Florida counties where the undervotes had not been
tabulated, but did not set standards for conducting the recount.75 Since the Florida
Supreme Court did not establish uniform rules for determining voter intent in
tabulating the undervotes, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the recount that had
70

See Gardner, supra note , at 908-09 (“[T]he basis of the plaintiffs’ invocation of the
right to vote is an almost paradigmatic expression of a theory of protective democracy. The
plaintiffs did not contend that the police jurisdiction of Tuscaloosa could not be extended
beyond its boundaries, but that it could not be so extended without a concomitant extension
of the franchise….In other words, they did not want to be subjected to laws enacted by
representatives whom they had no hand in choosing and over whom they exercised no
effective control.”).
71
Gardner, supra note (making this point).
72
See Harper
73
Gardner, supra note , at 973 (“The heart of a communitarian democracy claim is the
contention that the government has given the plaintiff less than it has given others, a claim
with obvious similarities to a prima facie claim of unequal treatment under equal protection
principles.”).
74
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
75
Id. at 100. The Florida Supreme Court also ordered a full recount in some counties,
further compounding the equal protection problems. Id. at 107-108.
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the effect of “valu[ing] one person’s vote over another,” violating the Equal
Protection Clause’s guarantee against “arbitrary and disparate treatment.”76 Like
Reynolds v. Sims, the Court presented the core problem with the recount as one in
which an individual’s vote either counts or is discarded by virtue of which county
he resides in. 77 Equal protection requires that states “value” votes equally, a
standard that “extends beyond the initial allocation of the franchise.”78 Opening the
door for an equal protection challenge to the nuts and bolts of election
administration was arguably not the Court’s intent, given that the disparate
counting of votes always exist in every election. So either Bush v. Gore cannot
mean what it says, hence the “ticket good for one day only” criticism that has
followed the decision,79 or there is something unique about the presidential context
that justifies a robust use of the Equal Protection Clause in this context.80
While both of these premises suggest that the equal protection holding of Bush v.
Gore does not apply to the nuts and bolts of election administration outside of the
context of presidential elections, it is the latter point that is most relevant here in
explaining why this might be the case. 81 Notably, the Court did not hold that
Florida may not vary the way in which it counts its ballots by county, or
alternatively, that the mechanisms for counting votes in every election must ensure
that every voter’s ballot is treated the same.82 Instead, the Court is upfront that this
situation is unique precisely because it implicates Article II, section 1, which
delegates to the states the authority to choose how electors are appointed.83 The
fact that Bush v. Gore is an equal protection case is a bit of a fluke, an approach
dictated by the Florida state legislature’s choice to extend the right to vote to its
citizens rather than standing as any indication that the Court is embracing an
affirmative vision of what the right to vote entails—protective democracy,
76

Id. at 105
Id.
78
Id. at 104.
79
Karlan, supra note , at 1363 (referring to Bush v. Gore as a rare equal protection case
in which the Court has “leveled down,” and the inequality is remedied by “depriving the
previously included group” of the benefit by ending the recount); 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 757;
68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 637; Klarman, 89 Cal. L. Rev. (2001).
80
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (making this
point).
81
Cf. Ohio Cases using Bush v. Gore
82
See id. See also id. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“We deal here not with an
ordinary election, but with an election for the President of the United States.”); Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (“In the context of a Presidential election, state-imposed
restrictions implicate a uniquely important national interest. For the President and the Vice
President of the United States are the only elected officials who represent all the voters in
the Nation.”).
77

83
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communitarian, or otherwise. Bush v. Gore signals the opposite, in fact. The
Court’s failure to hew to any one theory of voting is not immediately apparent, as
it seems to endorse the same vision of voting from Kramer in finding that the state
has to “value” votes equally, yet the Court’s failure to hold that Florida generally
may not vary the way in which it counts its ballots by county, or alternatively, that
the mechanisms for counting votes in every election must ensure that every voter’s
ballot is treated the same, illustrate that the case is not of the same vein as
Kramer.84
In reality, the theoretical foundation of voting is less important in the context of a
presidential election because it is the one situation in which the state can in fact
rescind the right to vote;85 thus, equal protection makes sense as a framework for
assessing the grounds that states have extended the franchise in this context
because it is unique among constitutional provisions that govern the involvement
of states in federal elections.86 The presidential context is one in which the right to
vote, standing alone, is arguably not as robust as other circumstances because the
states’ authority to deprive their citizens of this right is both historically and
textually grounded, but once the right is extended, state regulations that curb it
should be reviewed under strict scrutiny given the national interest at stake.87 Even
if the right to vote is defined by state law, the scope of a national election as well
as the discretion provided to the legislatures by the constitutional text undermines
any possibility of an affirmative vision of the right to vote in this context;88 all that
remains is a system of minimal entitlements defined by the efficacy of one vote vis
a vis another.
For this reason, it may be best to view the right to vote in the context of
presidential elections as different, both descriptively and normatively, and
therefore inappropriate for establishing the standards by which the Court
84

See Karlan, supra note , at 1364 (arguing that Bush v. Gore is about structural equal
protection, or the “perceived systemic interest in having recounts conducted according to a
uniform standard” rather than vindicating “the interest of an identifiable individual voter”).
85
Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (noting that “no federal constitutional right to vote for electors
for the President of the United States”).
86
See McConnell, supra note , at 661 (noting that Article II, Section 1’s delegation to
the legislatures of determining electors for presidential elections “puts the federal court in
the awkward and unusual posture of having to determine for itself whether a state court's
‘interpretation’ of state law is an authentic reading of the legislative will”).
87
See, e.g., http://lubbockonline.com/stories/120900/nat_120900078.shtml. See also
Michael McConnell, 68 U. Chi L. Rev. 657 By specifying "the Legislature" as the source
of state law, [Article II, Section 1] departs from the usual principle of federal constitutional
law, which allows the people of each state to determine for themselves how to allocate
power among their state governing institutions.”).
88
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determines whether the right to vote has been abridged. In Anderson v.
Celebrezze, the Court created the balancing test currently applied to regulations
affecting the right to vote, but subsequently has ignored that the test was developed
in the context of restrictive ballot access laws affecting candidates for the
presidency.89 The Ohio law at issue in Anderson required independent candidate to
declare their candidacy earlier than the nominees of the two major political parties.
Even though the Court previously had upheld ballot access restrictions in order to
promote the state’s interest in avoiding political fragmentation, it was “in the
context of elections wholly within the boundaries” of the state. In contrast, the
“State’s interest in regulating a nationwide presidential election is not nearly as
strong.”90 Despite this language, there is no acknowledgment, as in Bush v. Gore,
that presidential elections are different; instead, the Court has simply extended the
balancing test to every electoral context, with no delineation of the election at
issue. Recently, in Crawford v. Marion County, the Court applied the Anderson
balancing test to assess the burdens of a voter identification law on the right to
vote, with no acknowledgment of the context in which the law was being applied.91
Crawford struggled to reconcile Harper and Anderson, relegating strict scrutiny to
“rational restrictions on the right to vote [that are] unrelated to voter qualifications”
and reserving balancing for everything else. 92 The problem is that the Court’s
appropriation of equal protection analysis into the context of all elections, despite
its limited use in those circumstances where the legislature has delegated its
authority under article II, section 1 to choose presidential electors directly to the
voters, has not stopped lower courts from applying a similar equal protection
analysis to regulations of the right to vote across the board, no matter what the
interests at stake or the election as issue. 93 Using standards developed in the
presidential context as precedents to assess electoral regulations in other, more
pedestrian, contests obscures the harm of the regulation and minimizes the right
that is at stake. As the next section shows, the popular sovereignty foundations of
the right to vote undermine the equal protection foundation that implies that states
can rescind the right to vote at will, even for their own elections.

89

460 U.S. 780. Some might argue that this deference was unwarranted, even in the
context of presidential elections. See generally Gardner, supra note at 969 (“One of the
earliest manifestations of a tension between the constitutional scheme and popular
American beliefs about democracy was the almost immediate collapse of the electoral
college. Intended to be a body of wise and virtuous citizens exercising independent
judgment, it quickly devolved into a reliable conduit for the implementation, as nearly as
possible within constitutional constraints, of a form of direct presidential election.”).
90
91
92
93

Crawford v. Marion County, 553 U.S. 181, 189 (2008). See also Burdick v. Takushi
[cite cases]. See also Crawford v. Marion County
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II. THE RIGHT TO VOTE AS A POWER-RIGHT UNDER THE NINTH AND TENTH
AMENDMENTS
The Supreme Court conceives of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as textually
based limits on the authority of the federal government,94 the Tenth Amendment in
particular defined only by those portions of the Constitution that explicitly delegate
power to each of the three branches and the Ninth rarely mentioned beyond the
occasional concurring opinion. 95 While this principle of a limited federal
government has not been consistently adhered to, the last three decades has
witnessed a revitalization of Tenth Amendment constraints on federal power, with
the Court holding, for example, that Congress infringes on state sovereignty when
it forces states to take title for radioactive waste generated within their borders;96
stating that Congress cannot compel state officials to administer federal law;97 and
requiring a clear statement from Congress before the Court will treat state
legislation as preempted.98 Recently, the Court has expanded the sphere of Tenth
Amendment enforcement to include individuals, holding in Bond v. United States
that a person convicted under federal law can challenge their conviction on Tenth
Amendment grounds.99
Yet implicit in this jurisprudence is the assumption that only the states, and not
individuals, have cognizable interests under the Tenth Amendment because the
Court has assumed that, with respect to the constitutional structure, the interests of
the people are perfectly aligned with those of the state.100 Even the Bond Court,
which recognized that individuals “can assert injury from governmental action
taken in excess of the authority that federalism defines” and that their rights “in
this regard do not belong to the state,” would not go as far as to say that
individuals have reserve “power” under the Tenth Amendment because such power
does not translate easily into the rights/power framework with which we are
accustomed.101 Thus, the decision to allow an individual to enforce the boundaries
94
95

See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
97
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
98
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
99
Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
100
Probably the most famous iteration of the Ninth Amendment is in Justice
Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut, although it has appeared from time to
time. See also Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion
based in part on the Ninth Amendment).
101
Instead, the Court frames the liberty that individuals have under the Tenth
Amendment as a derivative of the diffusion of the power between the two sovereigns. and
aligns the individual’s interests with those of the state. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364.
96
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of federalism became an issue of standing, rather than a reflection of the
sovereignty that the people retain vis a vis their states.102
Few, if any, scholars have probed whether the delineation in the Tenth Amendment
of the powers that are “reserved to the states,” on one hand, or “to the people,” on
the other, signify that the people have powers under the Tenth Amendment that are
distinct and separate from the states, nor is there much discussion about how this
authority can be furthered.103 While this Article does not weigh in on the broader
debates surrounding which rights are protected by the Ninth Amendment, 104 it
views the Ninth Amendment is an indispensible medium to facilitate the people’s
Tenth Amendment sovereignty, as most scholars agree that the phrase “or to the
people” in the Tenth Amendment concern the allocation of sovereignty rather than
stand as a source of potential unenumerated rights.105
Unlike the courts, the legal scholarship has exhibited more comfort with the idea
that the people retain power, analyzing at length the extent to which popular
sovereignty principles constrain governmental action. 106 However, most of the
debate has taken place within the framework of judicial supremacy, or whether the
Supreme Court or the people have the final say about the meaning of the
Constitution,107 with occasional discussion about how the people best express their
102
103

See Lash, supra note , at 391-392 (arguing that the Ninth Amendment was intended
to protect the power of the states, but not delineating between the interest of the states and
those of the people). Lash assumes that when the federal government exceeds its
enumerated power, it encroaches on areas of law reserved to the states, presumably power
that the states would exercise on behalf of the people. Id 394 (“Madison conceived the
Ninth Amendment in response to calls from state conventions that a provision be added
limiting the constructive expansion of federal power into matters properly belonging under
state control…A rule of construction guarding the retained rights of the people amounted to
the same thing as limiting the power of the federal government to interfere with matters
believed left to state control.”).
104
1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1229, 1238 (noting that even during the debates
contemporaneous to the adoption of the Ninth Amendment, there was not a consensus as to
which rights were protected).
105
Massey, supra note at 1239.
106
See, e.g., 112 Harv. L. Rev. 434, 443 (1998) (arguing that, to the extent that the
legitimacy of government hinges on popular consent, then “each person’s voice must be
given equal weight” and “each person’s voice should be heard as fully and accurately as
possible.”); Akhil Reed Amar & Alan Hirsch, For the People: What the Constitution Really
Says About Your Rights 3-33 (using theory of popular sovereignty to argue that the
Constitution can be changed through majority vote).
107
Larry Kramer has, most famously, pushed back against the widely accepted premise
of judicial supremacy on popular sovereignty grounds, arguing that the Constitution is not
ordinary law, “not peculiarly the stuff of courts and judges;” rather, it is “a special form of
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sovereign will.108 Some scholars also study how popular sovereignty manifests
itself procedurally within the Constitution’s framework, 109 but most fail to give
extended thought to how the Constitution preserves certain rights that derive
almost entirely from state law in order to facilitate popular sovereignty.110

A.
The People’s Authority to Alter or Abolish Their State Governments
as the Predecessor of the Right to Vote
Under traditional political theory, as the sovereign, people could act collectively to
abolish the government or alter it through violent means. 111 Scholars typically
associate mob action as the purest expression of the people’s sovereign
authority.112 The belief that the people could resist the government through extraconstitutional mechanisms and by revising their constitutions without limit was
based on a theory of inherent rights, and it was broader than the original right of
revolution that prompted the war with Great Britain.113 Five of the eleven states
that drafted constitutions in 1776 contained alter or abolish provisions,114 while
others had amendment provisions similar to Article V.115
popular law, law made by the people to bind their governors.” But see Larry Alexander &
Lawrence B. Solum, Book Review: Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1594,
1640 (2005) (“Kramer has pushed the idea of popular sovereignty to its limit by embracing
the idea of constitutional interpretation by mob…it seems clear that, in its purest form,
popular constitutionalism is about as unattractive as a constitutional theory could possibly
be”).
108
For notable examples, see Fritz; Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech: The People’s
Darling Privilege: Struggles for Freedom of Expression in American History
109
8 Seton Hall Const. L. J. 363, 412 (1998) (arguing that the Constitution limits the
use of supermajority requirements “to instances that would reinforce popular sovereignty”).
110
111

Fritz at 17. Because the people retained the ability to abolish their state
governments, this is why the authority of the people and the power of the states treated, in
most respects, as identical. Lash, supra note , at 394. This assumption was also driven in
part by a view of the Founding generation that the states were too democratic and too
reflective of the desires of the citizentry; given this link, it made sense for the framers to
equate, as Kurt Lash argues, the “prerogatives of the people with the autonomy of the
states.” Id
112
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev.
4, 27 (2000) (“Mobbing was an accepted, if not exactly admired, form of political action common in England and on the Continent as well as in America. Mob action represented a
direct expression of popular sovereignty, justified as a last resort by the writings of Grotius,
Puffendorf, and Locke, not to mention long tradition.”).
113
Id. at 22.
114
DINAN, SUPRA note ; FRITZ, SUPRA note , at 24.
115
See generally Amar, supra note , at 487 (noting that various states had
constitutional clauses that looked like Article V, but arguing that these “Article V
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As Christian Fitz has argued, there were competing views at the Founding about
how the power to alter or abolish government should be domesticated from its
violent, British origins: that the “collective sovereign expressed its will only
through the use of procedural mechanism,” or alternatively, “collective sovereignty
meant that ‘the people’ could express their will directly…without using formal
procedures.”116 These competing strands took root at different levels of
government, with the federal government utilizing Article V as its own unique
version of the alter or abolish theory popularized by the Revolutionary War.117 In
contrast, state governments were not as formalistic, initially allowing the people
significant authority to revise their state constitutions at will,118 but by the Civil
War, facilitating this authority through individual rights that allowed the people to
control the composition of government.

1. Article V and Alter or Abolish at the Federal Level
The Constitution of 1787 is an attempt to tie the expansive authority of the new
government to the most credible source, the “sovereign” people, but without the
chaos that had accompanied popular sovereignty at the state level.119 In trying to
analogues were not…as exclusive” and “the polity had retained the legal right to alter or
abolish outside these analogues by simple majority vote”).
116
Id. at 268.
117
See Fitz, supra note , at 25 (describing the alter or abolish principle that came out of
the Revolutionary War as one that gave the people authority “to revise their constitutions
without limit”). See also Brannon Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional
Change, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 155, 178 ( ) (“Article V can be seen as the Constitution writ
small [because] [i]t affirms the right of the people to alter or abolish their
government…[but] the institutional procedures and supermajority requirements help
guarantee that reason and not passion guide the sovereign people”).
118
See Fitz, supra note , at 30 (“Americans routinely revised their constitutions by
citing the people’s inherent right as the sovereign to change their minds.”). See also Akhil
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131 (1991) (arguing that
the right of assembly and petition are “an express reservation of the collective right of We
the People to assemble in a future convention and exercise our sovereign right to alter or
abolish our government by a simple majority vote”). See Dinan, supra note , at3 (“the
drafters of the federal Constitution established a rigid amendment and revision process,
[but] state convention delegates have almost uniformly rejected this approach and adopted
relatively flexible procedures for constitutional change.”).
119
2 Farrand, supra note , at 88 (Madison’s characterization of the Legislatures that
would ratify the Constitution as “mere creatures of their State Constitutions” and were no
“greater than their creators [the people],” arguably helped to legitimize the Constitution’s
requirement that it be ratified by three-fourths of state conventions as having a basis in
popular sovereignty).
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determine how government can be based on a fairly narrow conception of “the
consent of the governed,” the framers created a structure that both embraced and
rejected certain beliefs about the nature of popular sovereignty. The new
government was not a wholesale rejection of the form of popular sovereignty that
was implicit in the Articles—that the authenticity of the people finds its best
expression through the filter of state government, but now this interest would be
represented in the Senate. Instead, the radicalism emerged in the Constitution’s
acknowledgment that there will be times when the views of the state and those of
its residents will diverge, dissent that can be expressed in part by members of the
House who represent smaller, more geographically compact constituencies. 120
Thus, the Constitution emphasizes localism by preserving a significant amount of
the state sovereignty that existed under the Articles of Confederation, but it also
recognizes that the people themselves retain both rights and powers with which
they entered the new union. The delegation of powers and rights directly to the
people and structurally through the house legitimated the more powerful national
government because its responsibilities no longer ran solely to the states.121
The idea that the people would continue to have considerable control at the state
level ultimately validated the form of government created by the framers, where
the people could only act through the filter of their state governments or,
alternatively, through their representatives.122 Undoubtedly, many of the framers
viewed democracy as inconsistent with the protection of property rights, and
rationalized that narrow access to the franchise and governance by elites was

120

See generally Morgan, supre note , at 83 (discussing the “fiction” of popular
sovereignty in seventeenth century England where, with respect to Parliament, there was
“no distinction between sovereign and subject, and in the absence of any higher expression
of popular will, could endow an existing government with absolute and arbitrary powers”).
121
WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, SUPRA note , at 31 (“In addition to correcting the
deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution was intended to restrain the
excesses of democracy and protect minority rights from overbearing majorities in the state
legislatures.”).
122
See Amar, supra note , at 1436 (“As sovereign, the People need not wield day-today power themselves, but could act through agents on whom they conferred limited
powers. Within the sphere of these delegated powers, government agents could legitimately
compel obedience in the name of their sovereign principal, but those agents lacked
authority to go beyond the scope of their agency. So long as the People at all times retained
the ability to revoke or modify their delegations, such agency relationships were in no
sense a surrender or division of ultimate sovereignty.”). But see Henry Monaghan, We the
People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 Colum. L. Rev.
121 (1996) (criticizing Amar for overlooking “the democracy restraining nature of the
Constitution” in trying to draw parallels between Article V and the traditional
understanding of the alter or abolish power).
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necessary to minimize this risk. 123 The framers hoped to escape the sometimes
chaotic and unwieldy democratic governance that existed at the state level, where
assemblies were elected under popular suffrage and contained officials from all
walks of life, the antithesis of the governance by landed gentry that many framers
preferred.124 The early days of the Republic reinforced this sense that a “natural”
aristocracy, led by elites, was the key to the success of representative democracy,
where the interests of the people would be adequately represented by reasoned and
learned gentlemen who govern through consensus rather than by faction.125
Learning from past mistakes, the framers provided that if the people wanted to
amend the Constitution or otherwise change their government, the remedy lies in
Article V’s amendment process, or alternatively, frequent elections.126 In limiting
the ability of the people to amend the new constitution, the framers repudiated old
notions of government as based on a virtually unbreakable contract between the
people and an equal or superior sovereign; now, the people are sovereign and
government is subordinate subject to the caveat that the people are limited in how
they can exercise their sovereignty. 127 Consistent with this, the Article V
amendment process prevented the direct involvement by the people in amending
the Constitution: amendments have to be proposed by two-thirds of both Houses of
Congress, or two-thirds of the states have to call a convention for proposing
amendments. 128 Under the Constitution, the people as sovereign agreed to be
bound, not only by its substantive mandates, but also the mechanisms by which it
could be altered.129
123

Federalist No. 10 (“Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of
turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the
rights of property; and having general been as short in their lives as they have been violent
in their deaths.”). There were some exceptions. See Keyssar, supra note , at 12).
124
Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics 7-9 (1965) (noting that “the
political background and deeper context of the Revolution lie in the ‘rise of the assemblies’
in America, from their rudimentary origins to the status of full-fledged legislatures
incapable of simple subordination to external political forces”). See also Federalist Papers
No. 10 (“Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government
[democracy], have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to perfect equality in
their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in
their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.”).
125
Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote 8 (“The planters, merchants and prosperous
farmers who wielded power and influence in late-eighteenth-century affairs had an
unmistakable interest in keeping the franchise narrow: a restricted suffrage would make it
easier for them to retain their economic and social advantages.”).
126
U.S. CONST. art. V.
127
FRITZ, SUPRA note , at 21-22.
128
U.S. CONST. art. V.
129
“After creating governments based on their authority as the sovereign, the people
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Given this, it is not surprising that there is no mechanism for direct democracy at
the federal level, 130 as well as no alter or abolish power that correlated to that
which existed at the state level. Splitting the atom of sovereignty allowed the
framers to use popular sovereignty as a principle that validated the new powers of
the national government, 131 while preserving “true” popular rule and
majoritarianism for the people in the states.132 This structure was consistent with
the view of the role of government shared by most people in the 1780s. As Jack
Rakove observed,
For most Americans, indeed, national politics mattered little…When
Americans thought about politics at all, they directed their concerns
were henceforth bound by their constitutions. Under this view, the written constitution and
the government it created were the only channels through which the sovereign’s will could
be recognized.” FRITZ, SUPRA note, at 21 (citing Chisholm v. Georgia). See also Amar,
supra note , at 1441 (arguing that only direct ratification by the people in convention could
limit state governments).
130
See Amar, supra note , at 460 (describing Article V as “minoritarian…[p]recisely
because ordinary Government is distrusted”). See also Fritz, supra note , at 135 (“The
federal framers did not include alter or abolish language in the federal Constitution.
Moreover, they rejected the assumption that the sovereign source creating the constitution
retained an inherent right of revision. The framers’ position dramatically departed from an
expansive view of the people’s sovereignty.”). There is an open question of whether direct
democracy violates the Guarantee Clause, a question that the Court has avoided as a
political question. See Pacific States. If I am correct, that the Clause is one of minimal
entitlements as opposed to a direct reflection of how state government must be structured,
then arguably, direct democracy is constitutional. See Part , infra.
131
Our constitution is based on the idea of sovereignty lying in the people, that “people
made a government legitimate or illegitimate by withdrawing their support.” FRITZ, SUPRA
note , at 16.
132
See also The Federalist No. 32 (arguing that “the State governments would clearly
retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not…exclusively
delegated to the United States”); The Federalist No. 39 (noting that the states possess “a
residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.”). See also CASS SUNSTEIN,
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 21 (1993):
[The framers] attempted to carry forward the classical republican belief in virtue—a
word that appears throughout the period—but to do so in a way that responded
realistically, not romantically, to likely difficulties in the real world of political life.
They continued to insist on the possibility of virtuous politics…[but] tried to make a
government that would create such politics without indulging unrealistic assumptions
about human nature. We might understand the Constitution as a complex set of
precommitment strategies, through which the citizenry creates institutional
arrangements to protect against political self-interest, factionalism, failures in
representation, myopia, and other predictable problems in democratic governance.
Id.
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toward local and state issues. These were the levels of governance whose
decisions affected their daily lives, and which had to cope with the
aftermath of a prolonged revolutionary struggled that had placed so
enormous a strain on American society.133
Robustly democratic states and a far less majoritarian federal government also
validated the idea that a Republic can exist in a country the size of the United
States.134 The framers believed that the American experiment could be successful
in protecting individual liberties by playing the two, very different, sovereigns
against each other.135
Thus, populism is notably absent from federal elections, as they were never
intended to be democratic in any meaningful sense. For example, the electors (not
voters) participating in the first and second presidential elections unanimously
selected George Washington to be president, 136 and three of the next five
presidents after Washington were all be from Virginia’s wealthy planter class, and
two of the five were a wealthy father-son duo from Massachusetts. The absence of
an affirmative federal right to vote contributed to this state of affairs because many
of the framers also were against the Constitution itself imposing suffrage
requirements for participation in House elections, utilizing voting as a means to
link the fortunes of the state and federal governments together, rather than as a
vehicle that could accurately convey the collective will of the people. 137 The
133

RAKOVE, SUPRA note , at 28. See also Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage
from Property to Democracy 1760-1860 42 (1960) (making a similar point).
134
Allison La Croix; Toqueville
135
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). In Gregory, the Supreme Court
argued that the “federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous
advantages”:
It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse
needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement
in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in
government; and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry.
Id. See also John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 399, 433 (2010) (describing the Constitution as “a complex effort to reconcile
competing values about the appropriate sphere of state authority” and describing one value
as the “value of federalism” and the other as “that of a stronger, more effective natural
government.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context,
47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1229 (1994) (describing federalism based on different conceptions
of the state).
136
A. James Reichley, The Life of the Parties 29, 34 (1992).
137
The Federalist No. 57. The full quote is: “Who are to be the electors of the federal
representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant;
not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humbles sons of obscure and
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framers were aware of the potential pitfalls that accompanied popular suffrage, and
tried to control for it by, for example, delegating to each house of Congress the
power to be the “Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
members,”138 given Congress the authority to set aside the election of even the
most democratically elected representative. Likewise, Article I, section 2 states
that the House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen “by the
People of the several States,” but it delegates to states the responsibility of
choosing the qualifications of the electors. 139 So presumably the people still
“choose” their representatives, but this provision allowed states to exclude
individuals from the franchise based on any number of criteria including wealth,
crime, age, race, and gender. This illustrated that, at least for federal elections, the
people do not have the final say over the composition of Congress.140 The framers
did not impose a similar requirement on the states, choosing only to impose a
minimum requirement of republicanism in recognition of the value that comes in
having a diversity of governing approaches as a means for effectuating the popular
will.

2. The Guarantee Clause and Expanded Suffrage as Constraints on
the Alter or Abolish Power in the States
The limited field of presidential candidates at the national level was inconsistent
with the broad authority that the people had to nominate their candidates of choice
for their own state legislatures. By allowing the people to directly control the
composition of government with very few structural checks like those that existed
for federal elections,141 the franchise evolved into a suitable replacement for the
people’s natural law right to alter or abolish government. The search for a
replacement was prompted by the Constitution’s ratification in 1789, but this
evolution actually started occurring much earlier in the founding era. Unlike the
federal government, the suspicion of popular sovereignty did not manifest into
structural changes that would dilute, or minimize this authority; instead, the postrevolutionary era saw not-so-subtle changes in the ability of the people to alter or
abolish their governments. For example, the state that later became Vermont
attempted to break away from New York in 1777, relying on the alter or abolish

unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United
States.” Id.
138
139

U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 2.
Chafetz, supra note , at 170. See also Franita Tolson, Congress’s Authority to
Enforce Voting Rights after Shelby County and Arizona Inter Tribal (manuscript on file
with the author).
141
See, e.g., U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 5; the Elections Clause; Art. II, Sec. 1.
140

DRAFT --NOT FOR CIRCULATION OR DISTRIBUTION

29

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY FOUNDATIONS

2/17/2014 7:11 PM

[Vol. __:_

power, but congressional leaders rejected this attempt as “untenable.” 142 Many
state leaders agreed, but did not want to (and did not believe they had the authority
to) abolish the alter or abolish power outright. Many post-1776 state constitutions
circumscribed this authority by adding mechanisms by which state constitutions
could be formally amended,143 and also, by providing the people with more power
at the polls, first in deciding who can be nominated and later in expanding who can
vote.
The adoption of the Guarantee Clause in 1787 formally necessitated changes to the
natural right to alter or abolish government. The requirement of republicanism,
although ill-defined during the founding era, 144 circumscribed the alter or abolish
authority by rejecting the violence that had accompanied exercise of this power.145
Some framers believed that the object of the Clause was “merely to secure the
States against dangerous commotions, insurrections and rebellions.” 146 Others
were against having a Guarantee Clause at all, believing that it would “perpetuat[e]
the existing Constitutions of the states,”147 tapping into the fear of democracy that
had prompted the structure of the federal government. Notably, Edmund Randolph
proposed an amendment, seconded by James Madison, that would have included
the words “and that no state be at liberty to form any other than a Republican
Government,” but both Randolph and Madison withdrew the amendment and the
second in favor of the language “that a Republican form of Government shall be

142

Fritz, supra note , at 55 (noting that “Americans could ‘alter or abolish’ their
governments but congressional leaders faced a quandary” because “maintaining the status
quo of newly established American governments was a more pressing concern than
extending the logic of the Revolution’s principles that might challenge those
governments.”).
143
Fritz, supra note , at 242 (“With one exception, every state between 1820 and 1842
holding a constitutional convention inserted a provision for amendment if one did not
already exist in its constitution”).
144
As William Wiecek noted in his seminal study of the Clause, there was very little
consensus about what the Guarantee Clause of Article IV actually requires. Wiecek, supra
note , at 13 (“If the word [Republican] did have a definable meaning it probably had
several, and they may have been vague, ambiguous, multifarious, or conflicting…a
republic might have been the antithesis of a monarchy or an aristocracy, yet [John] Adams
and others found no difficulty in imagining monarchic or aristocratic republics. Some of
the framers and their contemporaries expected the concept of republican government to
change over time, hopefully perfecting the experiment begun by the Revolution.”).
145
See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) (“In the case of an insurrection against a
state or the government thereof, the President is to interfere”).
146
Debates 280 (comments of Wilson).
147
Debates 281 (comments of Houston) (noting that the “Georgia [constitution] was a
very bad one”).
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guaranteed to each State and that each State shall be protected against foreign and
domestic violence.”148
Given the rejection of language that arguably would limit states to governments
that are Republican in nature, it is plausible that the alter or abolish power,
although different in kind from the power that existed during the revolutionary era,
has to be interpreted in light of the flexibility that the states retain in structuring
their governments in accordance with the Clause. Arguably, republicanism
requires some level of citizen participation, further validating the turn in the alter
or abolish power from one centered in violence to one consisting of political
rights. 149 As Roger Sherman argued during founding era debates about the
Clause’s meaning, a republican government is one that has three branches of
government, including legislative and executive branches determined “by
periodical elections, agreeable to an established constitution; and that what
especially denominates it a republic is its dependence on the public or the people at
large, without hereditary powers. 150 The “floor” of republicanism is not certain,151
and besides the likely prohibition of a pure monarchy at the state level, Congress
has used its authority under the Clause to suspend southern governments that
deprived African-Americans of civil and political rights post-Reconstruction as
nonrepublican in form.152 Functionally, this means that state governments could
148

Debates 281.
Countless law review articles have been written on what constitutes a republican
form of government, and many agree that republicanism requires that states extend political
rights to their citizens. See, e.g., Fred O. Smith, Jr., Awakening the People’s Giant:
Sovereign Immunity and the Constitution’s Republican Commitment, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
1941 (2012); Hans A. Linde, Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 65 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 709 (1994); Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section
4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513 (1962).
150
Roger Sherman to John Adams, July 20, 1789, reprinted in Adams, ed., Work of
Adams VI, 437. See also Fed. 39, defining a republican government as:
[A] government which derives all of its powers directly or indirectly from the great
body of the people; and is administered by persons holding their offices during
pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior.
Id. See also Wiecek, supra note , at 7 (“The negative senses of ‘republican’ that is
nonmonarchical and nonaristocratic commanded the assent of most Americans in 1787.
Beyond this it is unsafe to generalize about the precise meaning of the term.”).
151
See Sanford Levinson, Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of
Governance 102 (2012) (discussing the broadening of the franchise over time as “part of
the ‘living Constitution’” and noting that “[t]he fact that what was perfectly acceptable in
1788 or even 1888 is certainly unacceptable today suggests that any scholarly analysis of
‘republican govenrment’ in American political life must necessarily be part of what I
earlier called the ‘narrative of change’”).
152
See Military Reconstruction Act; Wiecek 12 (“Nearly all Americans were certain
that they wanted no monarchy in either the state or federal governments.”). See also
149
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radically defer from the representative nature of the federal government, and
citizens can tie the legitimacy of their state governments directly to their ability to
participate in its electoral processes.153
Notably, this turn away from the more violent alter or abolish power, though a
firmly entrenched natural right,154 corresponded to discussions in the eighteenth
century about whether voting was a natural right. As Alexander Keyssar argued in
his seminal study, “The idea that voting was a right, even a natural right, had
become increasingly widespread in the eighteenth century (its ancestry dated to
antiquity) and was embraced by many small farmers and artisans, as well as by the
most radical leaders of the revolution such as Franklin, Thomas Young of
Pennsylvania, and Ethan Allen of Vermont.”155 While the concept of voting as a
natural right did not become the dominant view,156 these discussions elevated its
importance as a mechanism for protecting other natural rights such as the alter or
abolish power. Voting, along with the rights of assembly and petition, became the
ideal theoretical foundations for reworking and reformulating the alter or abolish
power.157 It also provided an answer to the perplexing question of “how the people
act as one, like a traditional sovereign” at the state level, an answer that varied
Debates in the Federal Convention 281 (comments of Ghorum) (arguing that the Guarantee
Clause is essential because “an enterprising citizen might erect the standard of monarchy in
a particular state”).
153
See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (arguing that “the states cannot enjoy
republican governments unless they retain sufficient autonomy to establish and maintain
their own forms of government”). See also Gardner, supra note , at 961 (“Although states
are apparently free to provide more opportunities for self-protection through democratic
institutions than the [Guarantee] clause requires, they need not provide much if they so
choose.”).
154
Declaration of Independence. See also Alabama Constitution of 1819 (referring to
the alter or abolish power as “an unalienable, and indefeasible right”); Miss. Const. art. I, §
2 (1832) (same).
155
Keyssar, supra note , at 12.
156
The Supreme Court implicitly rejected this argument in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1
(1849), which is famous for its holding that the power to determine whether a state
government has been lawfully established is a political question, but also challenged the
suffrage provisions of the Rhode Island Constitution on the grounds that the property
requirements excluded half the state’s population of white males from voting.
157
See Christian Fritz, Recovering the Lost Worlds of Americas Written Constitutions,
68 Alb. L. Rev. 261 (2005). See also Kramer, supra note , at 25 (arguing that
“unconstitutional laws could be resisted by community members who continued to profess
loyalty to the government” and “[m]eans of correction and forms of resistence were well
established and highly structured. First and foremost, was the right to vote…[n]ext in
importane, though perhaps not effectiveness, was the right to petitution….[and] the newly
emerging right of assembly”).
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from how the authority manifested with respect to the federal government without
violence.158 Arguably, the use of voting as a means to facilitate the sovereignty of
the people contributed to the speed with which states broadened voter base.159
It is not until the post-Civil War era that the voting-as-natural-right debate would
pick up steam again, yet states expanded suffrage in the first half of the nineteenth
century, despite the lack of a firm basis in natural rights theory. 160 This change
was driven in part because of a shrinking electorate,161 and the expansion of the
voter base also was a foreseeable consequence of granting the people broad
authority to choose which individuals would actually be on the ballot.162 While
many states retained freehold requirements for voters, 163 at least initially, state
officials were quite liberal in allowing the public to play a substantial role in
choosing who could run for office in both state and federal elections. For example,
New Jersey law provided that “it shall be lawful for every Inhabitant of this State,
who is or shall be qualified to vote for Members of the State Legislature, to
nominate four Candidates to the Choice of the People, as Representatives in the
said Congress of the United States, by writing on one Ticket or Piece of Paper the
Names of four Persons…at least thirty Days previous to the Day of Election….”164
Similarly, New York election law divided the state into six districts, and gave the
people in each district the authority to elect one representative without articulating
any constraints on who could be nominated outside of those criteria specifically
mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.165 Connecticut likewise provided that “each
158

Fritz, supra note , at 268. See also John Adams, Diary Notes on the Right of Juries,
Feb. 12, 1771, in L. Kinvon Wroth, et al., eds., Legal Papers of John Adams 228-29 (1965)
(describing voting as “the Part which the People are by the Constitution appointed to take,
in the passing and Execution of the Laws”).
159
Kramer, supra note , at 109 (noting that citizen demands to “control the course of
government” was reflected in “expanded suffrage and higher voter turnout”).
160
See Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage from Property to Democracy 17601860 (1960).
161
162

Numerous scholars have noted the connection between who can be on the ballot
and who can participate in the election, see e.g., 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643; but there is also the
more practical concern that it is difficult for the state to allow anyone to be a candidate
while circumscribing that candidate’s support amongst the electorate.
163
See, e.g,, id. at 365 (quoting freehold requirements in the 1787 New York
Constitution).
164
Gordon DenBoer et al., eds., The First Federal Elections 1788-1790, Vol. III 16
(1986).
165
Id. at 361. See also Gordon DenBoer et al., eds., The First Federal Elections 17881790, Vol. III 362 (1986) (New York Constitution provides that “all such Elections [for
Representatives of the Congress] shall be held and conducted by such Persons and in the
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[Freeman shall] give his Votes or Suffrages for a number not exceeding twelve
Persons whom he Judges Qualified to stand in nomination for Representatives of
the People of this State to the Congress of the United States”166 while Delaware
allowed voters to name “two persons” for their one congressional seat, subject only
to the limitation that “one of whom at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same
County with themselves.”167 Virginia, in contrast, was one of the more restrictive
states and allowed voters to name one person for the office so long as that person is
“a freeholder and…a bona fide resident for twelve months.”168
The initial assumption in allowing voters to freely name their candidates was that
they would pull from the same pool of distinguished individuals; nonetheless, the
virtually unfettered ability to nominate candidates “of the people,” once conceived
as an aspect of the people’s sovereign authority,169 made the slide toward liberal
access to the ballot inevitable. The change was gradual at first – with Delaware
eliminating its property qualification for voting in 1792 and Maryland right after
the turn of the century.170 Then, Massachusetts and New York allowed more
liberal access to the ballot in the 1820s and Virginia and North Carolina in the
1850s.171 Similarly, between 1830 and 1855, six states abolished the poll tax.172
Notably, as Alexander Keyssar has observed, “none of the new states admitted to
the union after 1790 adopted mandatory property requirements in their original
constitutions.”173 In turn, state legislatures compelled municipalities to adopt more
liberal voting regulations for local elections, leading to a convergence between
state and local regulations that governed voter qualifications by 1855.

same manner as the Elections for Members of the Assembly of this State are by Law to be
held and conducted”). Gordon DenBoer et al., eds., The First Federal Elections 1788-1790,
Vol. II 70 (1984) (same for Delaware); id. at 290 (same for Virginia).
166
Gordon DenBoer et al., eds., The First Federal Elections 1788-1790, Vol. II 24
(1984).
167
Id. at 71.
168
Id. at 294.
169
See, e.g., Roderick Hills, A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal
Congressional Terms, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 97, 124 (1992) (defending the ability of state
citizens to add qualifications for federal legislators as an aspect of popular sovereignty).
170
Keyssar, supra note , at 29.
171
Id.
172
Id. See also Kramer, supra note , at 191 (noting that “wealth restrictions on voting
by white men were abandoned in many states even before the 1820s, and other majorityrestrictive devices were similarly replaced during these years. By the time of Andrew
Jackson’s first election in 1828, significant property or tax-paying requirements for voting
existed in no more than two or three states, and only in South Carolina were presidential
electors not popularly chosen”).
173
Keyssar, supra note , at 29.
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The expansion of the franchise coincided with the rise of mass political parties in
the 1820s, which underscored the view that political rights could express the
people’s sovereign authority and reinforced the ability of these rights to serve as a
replacement for the more robust alter or abolish power. 174 The increasing
competition between the political parties, and the corresponding increase in the
adult male population who could not meet the property requirements instituted by
most states in order to vote, motivated additional suffrage reform, which had
become a partisan political issue.175 In turn, these reforms led to the election of
more populous candidates such as Andrew Jackson, who ended the reign of the
Founding-era aristocracy.176 Over the next several decades, the right of the people
to alter and abolish their governments “became domesticated and evolved” in each
of the colonies, where “[b]allots would replace bullets.”177 During the Civil War
era, the people’s ability to alter or abolish their state governments officially moved
from a power grounded in violence to one that involved changing government
through democratic means, bringing full circle the connection between voting and
the alter or abolish power as vehicles of sovereign expression.178

B. Cementing a New Understanding of Alter or Abolish: The Civil War and
Reconstruction Era State Constitutions
As the prior section shows, the adoption of the Guarantee Clause made it doubtful
that the right of revolution that was exercised in 1776 could ever be justified.179
This premise would not be tested until the Civil War, the exigencies of which
174

Dinan, supra note , at 144 (noting that “Constitution makers during this period came
under pressure to eliminate any distinctions grounded in property holdings”).
175
Keyssar, supra note 34-36. Chilton, supra note , at 260.
176
Chilton, supra note , at 223 (noting that upon Jackson’s 1829 inauguration, “only
two of the states comprising that section of the country where had been born required a
freehold qualification for voting in any elections, North Carolina and Virginia”). See
Kramer, supra note , at 191 (noting that “wealth restrictions on voting by white men were
abandoned in many states even before the 1820s” and “[b]y the time of Andrew Jackson’s
first election in 1828, significant property or tax-paying requirements for voting existed in
no more than two or three states”).
177
Amar, supra note , at 464.
178
See Akhil Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside
Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 458 (1994) (arguing that “popular sovereignty principles
in America [had] evolved beyond the Lockean core of the Declaration and established the
legal right of the polity to alter or abolish their government at any time and for any reason,
by a peaceful and simple majoritarian process”). See also Fritz, supra note , at 124-126
(discussing debates in 1787 about whether the alter or abolish provision in the Maryland
Constitution, which described all government officials “as trustees of the public” included
a corresponding right of the people to instruct their representatives to the Senate).
179
Id.
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dictated that alter or abolish provisions would become significantly watered down
during the post-war era.180 Congress rejected the constitutions of states that
attempted to retain the same alter or abolish language from the pre-war era, and
failed to adequately protect political rights. The extension of the franchise to
nonfreeholding males in the first half of the nineteenth century, and the
significance of political rights in the wake of emancipation made suffrage an
obvious stand in for the once robust alter or abolish authority.181 [quick discussion
on the legal basis for secession in order to show that the alter or abolish power
had to be watered down but could not be completely eliminated because of its
status as a natural right]
During Reconstruction, the Republicans in control of Congress realized that, not
only did they have to ensure that African-Americans were granted the right to
vote, they also had to mitigate the natural right to alter and abolish state
government to prevent ex-confederates from overthrowing the new southern
regimes. This process started with ensuring that ex-confederates were
constitutionally barred from assuming elected office,182 and continued by changing
the nature of rights in state constitutions.183 As a result, states that had alter or
abolish clauses prior to the war, such as Arkansas, Alabama, Texas, and Florida,
instituted alter and abolish clauses in the 1860s and 1870s that were less far
reaching than their predecessors of the 1830s, but in response, these states
increased the political protections and rights of their citizens in the Reconstruction
era constitutions. During this era, African-Americans suffrage was the most
important issue at the time, and it is therefore not surprising that this authority was
seen as a natural replacement for the more robust alter and abolish provisions.184
Notably, only two of the state constitutions adopted by the former confederacy
during the post-Civil War era added “alter or abolish” provisions to their
constitutions, 185 and all of these provisions—both the newly added and the
180

See footnote 206, infra.
Many states eliminated freehold requirements well before the Civil War. See, e.g.,
Miss. Const., Art. I, Sec. 20 (1832) (“No property qualification for eligibility to office, or
for the right of suffrage, shall ever be required by law in this state.”); Fla. Const. Art. I,
Sec. 4 (1838) (same)..
182
U.S. Const. amend XIV, sec. 3
183
See, e.g., Alabama Constitution of 1867, Art. VII, Sec. 3 (providing that “the
following list of persons shall not be permitted to register, vote or hold office: 1 st, Those,
who, during the later rebellion, inflicted, or caused to be inflicted, any cruel or usual
punishment upon any soldier…of the United States, or who, in any other way, violated the
rules of civilized warfare. 2d, Those who may be disqualified from holding office by the
proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States, known as ‘Article XIV’…”).
181

184
185

Those states that added alter or abolish provisions constrained this power by
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preexisting clauses—were qualified in favor of federal power.186 The Civil War
and Reconstruction era brought about the domestication of the alter or abolish
power in favor of political rights, recognizing that sovereignty still lies with the
people but tying this power to principles of republicanism by emphasizing the
supremacy of federal law. For example, the South Carolina Constitution did not
have an alter or abolish provision in its Constitution at the time of the Civil War,
and rather than add this provision, the 1868 Constitution gave the people the right
to “at all times…modify their form of government,”187 but noting that “[n]o power,
civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right
of suffrage in this State.” 188 Congress had rejected South Carolina’s 1865
Constitution because the document did not adequately protect the voting rights of
the emancipated slaves.189

referencing federal law and disavowing a right of secession. See Va. Const. art. I, § 5
(1872) (adding an alter or abolish provision); id. at art. I, § 2 (“…all attempts, from
whatever source, or upon whatever pretext, to dissolve said Union or to sever said nation,
are unauthorized…”); Id. at art. I, § 3 (“That the constitution of the United States, and the
laws of congress passed in pursuance thereof, constitute the supreme law of the land, to
which paramount allegiance and obedience are due from every citizen, anything in the
constitution, ordinances, or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”). See also
N.C. Const. art. I, § 3 (1868) (adding an alter or abolish provision); id. at N.C. Const. art.
I, § 4 (1868) (“That this State shall ever remain a member of the ' American Union ; that
the people thereof are part of the American nation ; that there is no right on the part of this
State to secede, and that all attempts from whatever source or upon whatever pretext, to
dissolve said Union, or to sever said nation, ought to be resisted with the whole power of
the State.”
186
Notably, Georgia did not have an alter or abolish provision prior to the Civil War,
and arguably adopted language in its 1861 Constitution that would limit the ability of the
people to alter or change government. See Ga. Const. art. I, § 2 (1861) (“God has ordained
that men shall live under government; but as the forms and administration of civil
government are in human, and therefore, fallible hands, they may be altered, or modified
whenever the safety or happiness of the governed requires it. No government should be
changed for light or transient causes; nor unless upon reasonable assurance that a better
will be established.”). See, e.g., Louisiana Constitution of 1868 (no alter or abolish
provision added).
187
Compare S.C. Const. art. I, § 1 (1868) (“All political power is vested in and derived
from the people only, therefore, they have the right at all times to modify their form of
government.”) with S.C. Const. art. 9, § 1 (1790) (1861) (1865) (“All power is originally
vested in the people; and all free governments are founded on their authority, and are
instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness.”).
188
S.C. Const. art. II, sec. 2 (1868).
189
W. Lewis Burke, Killing, Cheating, Legislating, and Lying: A History of Voting
Rights in South Carolina After the Civil War, 57 S.C. L. Rev. 859, 861-62 (2006).
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Like South Carolina, the Alabama Constitution of 1868 gave its citizens the right
to “change,” but not abolish its government.190 Under the 1819 Constitution, the
people had retained “a right to alter, reform, or abolish their form of government,
in such manner as they may think expedient.”191 This document similarly provided
that “[e]very white male person of the age of twenty one years, or upwards, who
shall be a citizen of the United States and shall have resided in this State one year
next proceeding an election, and the last three months within the county, city or
town in which he offers to vote, shall be deemed a qualified elector,”192 a
requirement that the 1868 Constitution changed by eliminating the race restriction,
reducing the residency requirement to six months instead of a year,193 and adding a
requirement that all electors, prior to registering to vote, take an oath that to
“support and maintain the Constitution and laws of the United States;” “never
countenance or aid in the secession of this State from the United States;” and
“accept the civil and political equality of all men.”194
Arkansas’ constitution of 1868 contained a provision that allowed citizens to alter
or reform government, but it limited the ability of citizens to dissolve their
connection with or rebel against the federal government,195 as compared to its 1836
Constitution which gave the people an unqualified right to alter or abolish
government at will.196 Arkansas also provided that “all elections shall be free and
equal” 197 and granted suffrage to “[e]very free white male citizen…who shall have
attained the age of twenty-one years, and who shall have been a citizen of this
State six months”198 in its 1836 Constitution, which was expanded by 1868 to, like
Alabama law, eliminate the race requirement and exclude former confederates
from voting and holding office.199

190

Art. I, Sec. 3 (1868) (“That all political power is inherent in the people, and all free
governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit; and that,
therefore, they have, at all times, an inherent right to change their form of government, in
such manner as they may deem expedient.”). See also Ala. Const. art. I, § 3 (1875) (same);
Ala. Const. art. I, § 2 (1901) (same).
191
Ala. Const. art. I, § 2 (1819)
192
Alabama Constitution Art. III, Sec. 5 (1819).
193
Alabama Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 2 (1867).
194
Alabama Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 4 (1867).
195
196

Art. II, Sec. 2 (“That all power is inherent in the people; and all free Governments
are founded on their authority…For the advancement of these ends, they have, at all times,
and unqualified right to alter, reform or abolish their Government, in such manner as they
may think proper.”).
197
Arkansas Const. Art. II, Sec. 5. (1836).
198
Arkansas Constitution Art. IV, Sec. 2 (1836).
199
Arkansas Constitution, Art. VII, Secs. 2-5 (1868).
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Florida also had an “alter or abolish” provision in its Constitution at the time of
secession,200 but it amended this provision in 1868 to subordinate the people’s alter
or abolish power to “the paramount allegiance of every citizen” to the federal
government, and eliminate the ability of the people “to dissolve their connection
therewith.”201 Like Arkansas, the 1838 Florida Constitution provided for “free and
equal” elections, extending the vote to every “[e]very free white male person of the
age of twenty-one and upwards” who was a U.S. citizen, but subject to longer
residency requirement of “two years next preceding the election at which he shall
offer to vote.”202 Florida had attempted to retain the alter or abolish language from
its 1838 Constitution in the first constitution it submitted to Congress in 1865 as a
condition of readmission, but this constitution was rejected.203 Notably, the 1865
constitution also did not change its suffrage requirements, limiting voting to free
white males.204 Its 1868 constitution was significantly more inclusive, extending
voting rights to “[e]very male person of the age of twenty-one years…of whatever
race, color, nationality, or previous condition, who shall…be a citizen,” and it
reduced the residency requirement from two years to one year.205
Once Reconstruction ended, some states reintroduced broader alter or abolish
provisions, but this right was still qualified by an implicit expectation that the
people will use political power, rather than violence, to change government. For
example, Tennessee kept its alter and abolish provision in both its 1835 and 1870
Constitutions, but its 1870 Constitution specifically limited the circumstances in
which this power could be exercised to majoritarian political processes:
The Legislature shall have the right by law to submit to the people…the
question of calling a convention to alter, reform, or abolish this
Constitution, or to alter, reform or abolish any specified part or parts of it;
and when, upon such submission, a majority of all the voters voting upon
the proposal submitted shall approve the proposal to call a
convention…No change in, or amendment to, this Constitution proposed
by such convention shall become effective…unless approved and ratified
by a majority of the qualified voters…No such convention shall be held
oftener than once in six years.206
200

Fla. Const. art. I, § 2 (1838)
Fla. Const. art. 3, § 2 (1868); Fla. Const. art. 1, § 2 (1885).
202
Fla. Const. art. I, § 4 (1838); Id. at art. VI, § 1.
203
Fla. Const. art. I, § 2 (1865).
204
Fla. Const. art. VI, § 1 (1865).
205
Fla. Const. art. XIV, § 1 (1868).
206
Tenn. Const. art. 10, § 3 (1870). The 1835 constitution, although it contained a
similar alter or abolish provision as the 1870 version, did not provide a vehicle for
abolishing the constitution through official means. Unlike the 1870 constitution, it required
201
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Similarly, in 1874, Arkansas reinstituted a strengthened alter or abolish provision
than that which existed in the 1868 constitution, giving citizens the right to “alter,
reform or abolish…[government] in such manner as they think proper”207 yet this
right was qualified by an expansive requirement of free elections:
Elections shall be free and equal. No power, civil or military, shall ever
interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage; nor shall any
law be enacted, whereby the right to vote at any election shall be made to
depend upon any previous registration of the elector’s name; or whereby
such right shall be impaired or forfeited, except for the commission of a
felony at common law, upon lawful conviction thereof.208
Texas followed suit, giving its residents an alter or abolish authority in its 1876
Constitution after removing this language in its 1869 Constitution,209 but subject to
“the preservation of a republican form of government” rather than inalienable
“right to alter, reform, or abolish their government” that had existed under the
1836 Constitution. 210 In the post-Civil War era, the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing free and fair elections became significantly more elaborate than its
alter or abolish provision, signaling a change in the nature of which the people
express their sovereign authority. 211 For example, Texas’s 1836 constitution
granted the right to vote to every citizen, defined as “all free white persons,”212
“who has attained the age of twenty-one years and shall have resided six month
within the district or county where the election is held”213 whereas the right of
suffrage in its 1869 Constitution was more expansive:
Every male citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years and
upwards, not laboring under the disabilities named in this Constitution,
that the state legislature initiate the process of constitutional amendment. See Tenn. Const.
art. XI, § 3 (1835) (“proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds
of all the members elected to each House, then it shall be the duty of the General Assembly
to submit such proposed amendment or amendments to the people, in such manner, and at
such time, as the General Assembly shall prescribe. And if the people shall approve and
ratify such amendment or amendments, by a majority of all the citizens of the State, voting
for Representatives, voting in their favor, such amendment or amendments shall become
part of this Constitution”).
207
Arkansas Const. Art. II, Sec. 1 (1874).
208
Arkansas Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 2 (1874).
209
Tex. Const. art. I (1869).
210
211

See, e.g., S.C. Const. art. II, sec. 2 (1868);
Tex. Const. art. 6, § 12 (1836).
213
Tex. Const. art. 6, § 11 (1836).
212
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without distinction of race, color or former condition, who shall be a
resident of this State at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, or
who shall thereafter reside in this State one year, and in the county in
which he offers to vote sixty days next preceding any election, shall be
entitled to vote for all officers that are now, or hereafter may be elected by
the people, and upon all questions submitted to the electors at any
election…214
This section is markedly different than the suffrage provision of the 1866 Texas
Constitution rejected by Congress, which limited suffrage to “[e]very free male
person” rather than “[e]very male citizen,” and it did not disenfranchise former
confederates, 215 while retaining the same broad alter or abolish language as its
1832 counterpart.216 In addition to more expansive suffrage that penalized former
confederates, the 1869 constitution eliminated the alter or abolish provision and the
preamble to the bill of rights stated, “That the heresies of nullification and
secession, which brought the country to grief, may be eliminated from future
political discussion.”217
Even those constitutions adopted in late nineteenth and early twentieth century that
retained alter and abolish provisions were shadows of the power that had existed at
the Founding,218 using these provisions as a basis for exercising political power
rather than violent overthrow of government. Mississippi had an “alter or abolish”
provision that was removed after the Civil War.219 It was reinserted in the 1890
214

Tex. Const. art. 6 § 1 (1869)
Tex. Const. art. 3 § 1 (1866)
216
Tex. Const. art. I, § 1 (1866):
All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded
on their authority, and instituted for their benefit' and they have at all times the
inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their form of government, in such
manner as they may think expedient.
217
Tex. Const. art. I, § 1 (1869)
218
The Oklahoma constitution of [date] similarly provided that people have a right to
“alter or reform” (not to abolish!) their governments, and further, “such change shall not be
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.” [cite] The 1865 Missouri constitution
also kept its alter or abolish provision from its 1820 constitution, although it added that
“every such right should be exercised in pursuance of law, and consistently with the
Constitution of the United States.” Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 5. (1865), and it included very
specific processes by which the constitution could be amended or altered by majoritarian
processes. Id. art. XII, § 3.
219
The Constitution of 1832, in effect at the time of secession, read:
That all political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded
on their authority, and established for their benefit; and, therefore, they have at all
times an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter or abolish their form of
215
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Constitution, and is still a part of the state constitution today; however, like Florida
and Texas, Mississippi’s citizens could only act in accordance with the alter or
abolish provision if such action did not violate the U.S. Constitution.220 Notably,
in 1967, Kentucky voters used their constitutional authority to “alter or abolish” as
a legal basis for changing their constitution through direct democracy.221 This use
of the power as a basis for democratic action, rather than violence, signaled its
complete evolution from its Revolutionary War origins.222

government, in such manner as they may think expedient.
Miss. Const. art. I, § 2 (1832)
After the Civil War, that provision was removed and another provision was added,
specifically declaring the state would never secede from the union:
The right to withdraw from the Federal Union on account of any real or supposed
grievances shall never be assumed by this State; nor shall any law be passed in
derogation of the paramount allegiance of the citizens of this State to the Government
of the United States.
Miss. Const. art. I, § 20 (1868)
220

The Constitution in effect today, the Constitution of 1890, maintains an “alter or
abolish” provision. However, the power to abolish is conditioned on such an action being
allowed by the U.S. Constitution:
The people of this state have the inherent, sole, and exclusive right to regulate the
internal government and police thereof, and to alter and abolish their constitution and
form of government whenever they deem it necessary to their safety and happiness;
Provided, Such change be not repugnant to the constitution of the United States.
Miss. Const. art. III, § 6 (1890).
In addition, an anti-withdrawal clause remains:
The right to withdraw from the Federal Union on account of any real or supposed
grievance, shall never be assumed by this state, nor shall any law be passed in
derogation of the paramount allegiance of the citizens of this state to the government
of the United States.
Miss. Const. art. III, § 7.(1890).
221
www.LRC.ky.gov/lrcpubs/1059.pdf
222
Kramer, supra note , at 192. See also Fritz, supra note , at Chapter 8 (discussing the
debates over the people’s authority to change the constitution outside of existing laws in
the context of the rebellion in Rhode Island in the 1840s). The Supreme Court, in Luther
v. Borden, concedes the existence of this power, although given the outcome of the
rebellion, it is questionable whether this authority legitimately can be exercised through
violence. See Luther v. Borden, (finding that the actions Rhode Island officials under
martial law were justified).
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C. From Power to Right: Voting as a Ninth Amendment Right that Bind the
States
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, forty-nine state constitutions contain an affirmative
right to vote.223 It is no surprise, therefore, that state courts have historically been
more amenable to voting claims premised on democratic notions of participation
than federal courts.224 Additionally, as the prior section shows, the rise of suffrage
as a substantive right under state constitutions corresponded with the decline of the
right to abolish state governments in those same documents, arguably illustrating
how suffrage was one of the rights (along with speech and assembly) that replaced
the alter or abolish right as the primary expression of popular sovereignty.
Despite the sovereign pedigree of voting as an heir to the revolutionary era alter or
abolish provisions, voting had never found its place as an explicit right under the
U.S. Constitution until the Supreme Court read it into the Equal Protection Clause
in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections. While the framers of the
Constitution viewed state law as the ultimate source of who can vote in federal
elections, the Court did not utilize state law as a basis for conceptualizing the right.
Instead, the Court recognized the mandatory nature of the right to vote in federal
elections, while leaving the right to vote in state elections as entirely permissive.
To the extent that the right to vote in state elections has its foundations in the right
of the people to alter or abolish their governments, however, it would have been
more consistent for the Court to read the Ninth Amendment as encompassing a
right to vote in state elections that is also mandatory in nature. Notably, Akhil
Amar has referred to the “collective right of We the People to alter or abolish
government” as “the most obvious and inalienable right” underlying the Ninth

223

See Josh Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions. See, e.g., Ariz.
Const. art. II, § 21 (“All elections shall be free and equal, and no power, civil or military,
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.”); Ga. Const.
art. II, § 1, P 2 (“Every person who is a citizen of the United States and a resident of
Georgia as defined by law, who is at least 18 years of age and not disenfranchised by this
article, and who meets minimum residency requirements as provided by law shall be
entitled to vote at any election by the people.”); Ind. Const. art. II, § 1 (“All elections shall
be free and equal.”); Iowa Const. art. II, § 1 (“Every citizen of the United States [meeting
the age and residency requirements] … shall be entitled to vote at all elections which are
now or hereafter may be authorized by law.”); N.M. Const. art. II, § 8 (“All elections shall
be free and open, and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the
free exercise of the right of suffrage.”)
224
Rick Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 69; See also Weinschenk v.
State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006) (striking down a photo identification law as a violation
of the right to vote under the state constitution).
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Amendment;”225 other scholars also adhere to this view of the Ninth as containing
this principle.226
Inherent in the argument that the Ninth Amendment protects the right to alter or
abolish government is that the Amendment only protects collective rights, rather
than individual rights like the right to vote.227 Arguably, the Ninth Amendment
does not have to be read this narrowly—its historical antecedents suggest that it
was adopted because of Anti-Federalists concerns that enumerating some rights
would imply the exclusion of others, suggesting that positive rights and natural
rights, rather than just collective rights, could also be protected under the Ninth
Amendment.228 Given that concerns about rights were at the heart of its adoption,
it is plausible that the Ninth Amendment was designed to protect both the
individual rights and the collective rights of the people, a view further bolstered by
the historical link between the power to alter or abolish government and the
exercise of political rights like voting, speech, petition, and assembly in
furtherance of this right. 229 While voting may fall short of being accorded the
status of a natural right,230 a view of the Ninth Amendment that would exclude
225

Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights 120 (1998).
Jeffery Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 Yale L.J.
1078 (1991); Randy Barnett,
226

227
228

See Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights 250 (2001) (“What rights did
the Ninth Amendment protect? They had to be either ‘natural rights’ or ‘positive rights’, to
use the terms Madison employed in the notes for the great speech of June 8 advocating
amendments. In that speech he distinguished ‘the preexistent rights of nature’ from those
‘resulting from the social compact’…[and] he mentioned freedom of ‘speech’ as a natural
right…”). See Rosen, supra note , at (arguing that, in addition to the power to alter or
abolish government, the Ninth Amendment protects the individual rights to “worship God
according to the dictates of conscience” and of “defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing and protecting property…”). See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost
Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty 258 (2004) (discussing other rights referred to as
“natural in the documentary sources” including “the right to emigrate or to form a new
state, the rights of assembly, and the freedom of speech”). See Lash, supra note , at 88
(describing Ninth Amendment rights as “individual, majoritarian, or collective”).
229
See Randy Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 Tex. L. Rev.
1, 16 (pushing back against the argument that the Ninth Amendment only protects
collective rights). But see Lash, supra note 89 (arguing that a retained right might be
“individual in nature but collective in terms of the combined effect of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments”).
230
See Keyssar, supra note , at 12 (discussing how the notion of voting as a natural
right had gained a foothole in post-revolutionary America because “it meshed well with the
Lockean political theory popular in eighteenth century America, it had a clear
antimonarchial thrust, and it had the virtue of simplicity” but such arguments never became
dominant because “there was no way to argue that voting was a…natural right without
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voting, which at a minimum is a positive or majoritarian right,231 is untenable, as
this would suggest that the Amendment protects a right to alter or abolish
government with no corresponding authority to define the means by which this
right will be enforced.232 Moreover, state constitutions extended suffrage to their
residents prior to the ratification of the Constitution, suggesting that even if voting
is not a natural right, it can still be a “retained” right under the Constitution.233
Indeed, the sovereignty authority that the people retained under the Tenth
Amendment, given the limitations placed on the right of revolution by the
Guarantee Clause, arguably require the Ninth to protect a category of rights that
are central to exercising this power.234 Thus, contrary to the view advocated by
some scholars, the Ninth Amendment cannot be a mere truism, 235 defined by
opening Pandora’s box”).
231
Lash, supra note 88.
232
While Lash denies that the Ninth Amendment is a source of right, at the very least,
it protects the people’s authority to define and regulate rights protected by state law. See
id. To illustrate this principle, Lash discusses the Alien and Sedition Acts which James
Madison argued violated the First and Tenth Amendments because “the First Amendment
denied the federal government control over the retained right to freedom of speech, [and]
the Tenth Amendment left seditious libel under the control of the people of the several
states”). The Ninth and Tenth Amendments protect the people’s authority to define and
regulate retained rights, regardless if those rights are viewed as individual or collective and
regardless if the Ninth Amendment is actually the source of the right. Id. at 88.
233
Cf. Barnett, supra note , at 60-61 (describing retained rights as “rights that people
possess before they form a government and therefore retain; they are not positive rights
created by the government.”) with Lash, supra note , at 88 (defining a retaining right as “a
right withheld from governmental control” and arguing that the Ninth Amendment leaves
to the people the decision of how and when a right can be regulated).
234
235

See, e.g., Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment as Perceived by Randy Barnett, 88
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1508 (1994); Charles J. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual
Liberty: The Ninth Amendment's Forgotten Lessons, 4 J.L. & Pol. 63 (1987); Thomas B.
McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights “Retained” by the
People, 16 S. Ill. U. L.J. 267, 268 (1992); Caplan. See also Gary Lawson, A Truism with
an Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in Constitutional Context, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 469,
472 (2008) (“The Bill of Rights, including the Tenth Amendment, in large measure simply
reformulates the restrictions on federal power built into the Sweeping [Necessary and
Proper] Clause.”); Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth
Amendment, Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1889 (2008) (noting that the Tenth Amendment “delivered on a promise to the state
conventions that the federal government would have only expressly delegated power”).
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300,
1345 (S.D.AL.2002) (arguing that the Tenth Amendment “expresses only the ‘tautology,’
inherent in a Constitution of limited and enumerated federal powers, that whatever is not
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reference to those provisions of the U.S. Constitution that expressly delegate
power to the federal government.236 As Kurt Lash has argued, these Amendments
also declare that “those powers which are delegated are not to be construed as
having no other limits besides those enumerated in the Constitution;” such a
reading, according to Lash, “would have the effect of denying or disparaging the
people’s retained rights—rights which, by definition, were retained by the people
in the states.”237 To go one step further, defining Ninth Amendment rights and
Tenth Amendment powers by reference to what the federal government retains
also assumes that the interests of the state and those of the people are identical,
while ignoring the sovereignty that people retain in their own right.238 The Ninth
Amendment is the textual home for power-rights that express the sovereign
conferred on the federal government or prohibited to the states is by process of elimination
reserved to the states.”); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (same).
236
Cf. Massey, supra note at 1239 (“the inescapable conclusion remains that both
amendments were intended to preserve to the people of the states the sovereign’s
prerogative to confer powers upon their state governmental agents (recognized in the tenth
amendment) and to create personal liberties inviolate from governmental invasion
(recognized in the tenth amendment). The intended medium for doing so, in both cases,
was the state constitution.”). Massey is not alone in viewing the Ninth Amendment as a
source of judicially enforceable unenumerated rights. See Randy E. Barnett, James
Madison's Ninth Amendment, in 1 Rights Retained by the People; Thomas C. Grey, The
Original Understanding and the Unwritten Constitution, in Toward a More Perfect Union:
Six Essays on the Constitution 145 (1988); John Kaminski, Restoring the Declaration of
Independence: Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, in The Bill of Rights 150 (1987);
Lawrence G. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth.
But What on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment?, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 239
(1988); Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution. Nor is Massey alone in viewing
state law as a potential source of Ninth Amendment rights. See Lash, supra note , at 399
(“All retained rights, natural or otherwise, were protected from denial or disparagement as
a result of the decision to enumerate “certain rights.” Neither the text nor the purpose of the
Ninth Amendment was limited to protecting a subcategory of retained rights. The point was
to protect the right of the people to manage all those affairs not intended to be handed over
to the federal government.”).
237
Lash, supra note , at 93.
238
Randy Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 5
(“when rights are viewed as the logical obverse of powers, content can be given to
unenumerated rights by exclusively focusing on the expressed provisions delegating
powers…avoiding the need to directly address the substance of unenumerated rights” and
second, this approach “seems to avoid any internal conflict or logical contradiction
between constitutional rights and powers.”). Lash, supra note , at 90 (“Together, these two
amendments preserve all nondelegated powers and rights to the decisionmaking authority
of the people in the states, who may then leave the matter to the majoritarian political
process or exempt the subject from the political process by placing it in the state
constitution”).
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authority retained by the people under the Tenth Amendment. 239 Most important,
the right to vote, as the key power-right, derives almost entirely from state
constitutional law, illustrating that state law stands as the source of developing the
contours of the right, which is in line with what some scholars advocate as the
purpose behind the Ninth Amendment.240
Calvin Massey, for example, has argued that the Ninth Amendment “allow[s] the
people of each state to define unenumerated rights under their own constitution and
laws, free from federal interference.” 241 As Massey observes, this is consistent
with a dynamic conception of the Ninth Amendment that “reserve[s] to people
their rights under local law,” and therefore, it makes sense “for a state polity to
have within its own control the continued vitality of any given state constitutional
right.”242 In making the argument that the source of Ninth Amendment rights are
to found in state constitutional law, however, Massey argues that states have the
authority to rescind or otherwise alter there rights even though they have attained
the status of a federal constitutional guarantee.243 The difficulty with this argument
is that, during the Founding era, the alter or abolish power was viewed as
inviolable and implicit in the sovereignty retained by the people, suggesting that
they are limitations to the state’s ability to rescind Ninth Amendment rights.
Using state constitutional law as a source of Ninth Amendment rights means, in
practice, that the scope of the right to vote that the people enjoy under state law
will vary by state, as did the right of people to alter or abolish their governments,
239

Although Kurt Lash takes a narrow view of the Tenth Amendment, he argues that
the Ninth Amendment serves a rule of construction for interpreting the limitations of the
Tenth Amendment. Kurt T. Lash, The Lost History of the Ninth Amendment (2009).
While I am not convinced that the Tenth Amendment merely restates that the federal
government is one of limited powers, my argument draws on Kurt Lash’s observation that
the Ninth Amendment, like the Tenth, is also about the power that the people have to
regulate and define retained rights at the state level. See text accompanying footnotes ,
infra.
240
See Lash, supra note , at 251 (“the ratifiers were promised that all nondelegated
powers and rights were retained by the people in the states——‘retained’ being the
operative word for it signaled a preexistent collection of sovereign peoples and guaranteed
that these people would retain their independent sovereign existence after ratification.”).
241
1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1229, 1238.
242
Id. The idea of Ninth Amendment rights as “dynamic” rights that can change over
time is consistent with what Larry Kramer has described as constitutional modification
through popular consent, in which “the constitution could be altered by clear, convulsive
expressions of popular will.” Larry D. Kramer, By the People Themselves: Popular
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 15 (2004).
243
Massey, supra note at 1248. Kurt Lash has also suggested that state law can be a
source of unenumerated Ninth Amendment rights, although he does not go into detail about
whether states can rescind these rights.
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but this is consistent with the state level experimentalism embraced by our system
of federalism244 and the notion that rights that owe their existence to state law are
dynamic, rather than static. 245 Nonetheless, states do not have the authority to
rescind the right to vote or any other participatory rights that were part and parcel
of the inviolable right to alter or abolish government, consistent with founding era
assumptions that this right was inherent in the sovereignty retained by the
people.246
The fact that state constitutional law is the source of, first, the alter or abolish
provisions, and later the right to vote, also means that the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments incorporate the basic assumption that these rights apply against both
the states, and through Article V, the federal government.247 Logically, it makes
little sense to exclude the Ninth Amendment from binding the states given that the
Ninth Amendment preserves the people’s independent sovereign authority that
predated the Union.248 In addition, states have, to some extent, bound themselves
by giving the people significant authority over their composition and the execution
of their laws, authority that has existed at the state level for well over two hundred
years.249 In this vein, Ninth Amendment rights “amount[] to a federally enforced
right to make the states abide by their own law,”250 which is something that the
Supreme Court had already started to do with respect to the right to vote under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but, because of the

244

Gregory v. Ashcroft
Massey, supra note , at 1248; Kurt Lash, The Lost History of the Ninth Amendment
88 (“Retained rights may be individual, majoritarian, or collective, and the Ninth
Amendment ensures that all such rights are left under the control of the people in the
states.”).
246
See Fritz, supra note , at 274-75 (noting that the right to alter or abolish government
is “inherent” and a part of the people’s sovereignty, a position vindicated by the Supreme
Court in Luther v. Borden).
247
Some commentators argue that the Ninth Amendment rights apply only against the
federal government because that amendment has not been incorporated against the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S.
243 (1833). See also Ely, at 37; Berger, at 23-24.
248
Cf. Lash, supra note , at 76 (arguing that the Ninth Amendment “does not limit the
power of state governments” but state officials must follow it as a rule of construction).
249
Massey, supra note at 1251 (arguing that Ninth Amendment rights are still federal
rights, despite the fact that their contours are defined by reference to state law, and they
should not be distinguished from other federal rights that are incorporated against the
states).
250
Id. (citing Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights, 38 Hastings L.J. 305, 327
(1987)).
245
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limitations of that clause, the Court has fallen short of articulating an accurate and
compelling view of the right over the long term.251
This view of the right to vote as one part federal constitutional guarantee and one
part creature of state law has been lurking in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
for over a hundred years. While the Nineteenth Amendment has repudiated Minor
v. Happerset, the Court rightfully conceived of the right to vote in both state and
federal elections as entirely derivative of state law, a fact that is consistent with
how the current Court views state control over the franchise in the context of state
elections.252 In Minor, the Court observed that the “United States has no voters in
the States of its own creation,”253 a conception of voting that remains true today.
Other cases decided around the same time as Minor also defers to states’ authority
to define the right of suffrage and who has access to it, 254 and while states are
constrained in their ability to discriminate in voting, they still retain substantial
control over access to the ballot.255 Shelby County v. Holder and Arizona v. Inter
Tribal Council have corroborated this view of state authority, noting that
“[p]rescribing voting qualifications…‘forms no part of the power to be conferred
upon the national government’ by the Elections Clause, which is ‘expressly
restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of
elections.’”256

251

Id. (discussing Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’r of Webster
County, 109 S.Ct. 633 (1989) (finding an equal protection violation where the West
Virginia tax assessor’s practice of assessing property price differently for land recently sold
and older properties caused huge disparities in valuation in violation of the West Virginia
constitution). (discuss other examples above the line). Also, note that there is a line of
cases which hold that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from forcing state
officials to enforce state law, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman 465
U.S. 89 (1984), a case that Massey distinguishes by noting that Allegheny “posed an issue
of federal law, albeit one the substance of which was supplied by a state constitution, while
Pennhurst raised a claim of pure state law, with no federal medium to transmute the
asserted state right into a federal guarantee.”).
252
Arizona v. Inter Tribal; Shelby County
253
254

See, e.g., Giles v. Harris. Cruikshank?
Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (invalidating the formula of
section 4(b) of the VRA, which determined the jurisdictions that had to preclear with the
federal government any changes to their election laws before the changes could go into
effect). Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013) (holding
that the National Voter Registration Act preempts Arizona’s requirement that citizens show
proof of citizenship in order to register to vote).
256
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2258 (2013).
255
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As should be readily apparent, this view of the Ninth Amendment right to vote
calls into question the lockstepping that state courts have engaged in as a part of
interpreting the right to vote under state constitutions.257 As Josh Douglas has
recently argued, the deference that state courts give to the federal constitution, in
many cases attempting to create parity between state and federal conceptions of the
right to vote, actually has the effect of undermining the right.258 Since all state
constitutions explicitly provide voting protection to their citizens, including in
most cases recognizing an explicit right to vote, Douglas rightly argues that parity
between state and federal constitutions is not only unwarranted, but undesirable,
given that the federal constitution’s recognition of the right to vote is implicit,
judicially created, and most important, more narrow than the right to vote
recognized by state constitutions.259 This approach by state courts ignores that
virtually every state constitution goes further than the federal constitution in
protecting voting rights, an oversight that is inconsistent with the Ninth and Tenth
Amendment protections that the people have vis a vis the states.
Instead, the lockstepping should work the other way. Conceptions of the right to
vote in certain federal elections should almost solely be informed by the popular
sovereignty principle and state conceptions of the right to vote. Because Article I,
§ 2 links the qualification of electors for state and federal elections, this principle
provides the framework for the right to vote in federal elections. The normative
implications of this, discussed in the next section, are several. 260 With the
exception of presidential elections, state law would supply the rule of decision with
respect the right to vote in federal elections, a reading that does not disturb much
of the authority that states already have with respect to crafting the rules that
govern both state and federal elections. 261 Thus, this deference to state
257
258
259

See also 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 313, 318 (2007) (noting that “[state] courts recently
confronted with voter participation claims have generally begun by asking whether there
exists a Supreme Court precedent that applies strict scrutiny or lenient review to a facially
similar law. If so, and if the court is satisfied that the law at issue is sufficiently similar, the
court will take shelter under the Supreme Court's decision.”).
260
My argument also suggests that perhaps federal courts should be looking to state
courts in defining the contours of the federal right to vote, a point that Josh Douglas has
persuasively argued. See
261
This is important because there is a credible argument that this view of the Ninth
Amendment as creating a federal enforced guarantee based in state constitutional law could
create a conflict between state and federal law that runs afoul of the Supremacy Clause.
See Massey, supra note , at 1253 (arguing that in cases of conflict, “the right that has its
source in federal law should prevail”). Such conflicts are unlikely here because the Article
expressly observes that the federal electoral regime is different given the nature of the U.S.
government as representative rather than a pure democracy, and therefore the popular
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constitutional authority is consistent with those provisions of the Constitution that
directly bear on elections – for example, Article I, section 4’s proscription that
“[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;”
Article I, Section 2’s delegation of authority to choose the qualification of electors
so long as “the Electors in each States shall have the Qualifications requisite for
Electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.”262 In this context,
Congress can veto contrary state laws pursuant to its authority under the Elections
Clause and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; nonetheless, states still
retain plenary authority to determine the substantive contours of the right to
vote. 263 The popular sovereignty principle dictates that state elections function
differently. While states also retain the authority to craft rules that govern its own
elections under the Tenth Amendment, courts must approach the regulation of
state elections differently than it does with respect to federal elections, giving
equal weight to the popular sovereignty principles embraced by the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments.

III. THE POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY PRINCIPLE IN ACTION: ASSESSING
VALIDITY OF STATE ELECTORAL REGULATIONS

THE

As the prior section shows, the popular sovereignty foundations of the right to vote
undermine the argument that the right to vote is an equal protection concept that
states can rescind at will, even for their own elections.264 This analysis does not,
however, validate the strict scrutiny used to assess the poll tax in Harper v. State
Board of Elections, a standard that can obscure the considerable authority that
states do have in this context.265 This reframing of the right suggests that a
reformulated Anderson v. Celebrezze/Burdick v. Takushi/Crawford v. Marion
County sliding scale analysis may be a better fit to assess burdens on the right to
vote rather than strict scrutiny advocated by some scholars because balancing
sovereignty principle would be much more narrow in the context of federal elections. See
Part , supra. Indeed, the focus here is on the regulation of state legislative redistricting,
which has little, if any implication, for the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
262
263

See Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?
Start this section with a discussion of this news story?
http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/arizona/capitol_media_services/article_8a05991e-7f0411e3-8a04-001a4bcf887a.html
265
See Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement.
See also Fishkin, supra note , at 1329 (defending the balancing approach in Crawford
because it “nudged courts' role away from the broad structural evaluation and redesign of
election administration regimes and toward a clear focus on whether individual voters are
being excluded”).
264
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allows courts to weigh the voter’s interest and the state’s interest from the baseline
that both are constitutionally and historically grounded. This analysis is contrary
to most approaches in the legal scholarship, which has extensively criticized the
Burdick balancing test for privileging the state’s interest over the importance of the
right to vote, particularly in light of the structural obstacles insulating the major
political parties from competition and therefore limiting the ability of voters to
participate in the political process.266 In this context, the popular sovereignty
principle would level the playing field, forcing the court to consider the arguments
on both sides rather than proceeding from the baseline that states enjoy plenary
authority to regulate access to the franchise while voters have little or no
corresponding interest at stake.267 To illustrate this concept, Parts III (A) and (B)
explores the popular sovereignty principle in the context of ballot access and voter
identification regulations.268
This right to vote, as an expression of sovereign authority that derived from state
level alter or abolish provisions, and by implication, followed the people into the
creation of the union, can be read into the Ninth and Tenth Amendments using the
same the interpretive method that the Court has applied with respect to determining
the power that the states retain in its Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. In U.S
Term Limits v. Thornton, the Supreme Court held that states retain the powers held
pre-ratification and that were not expressly delegated to the federal government.
266

Pildes and Issacharoff (describing this as a political lockup that justified heightened
judicial scrutiny).
267
See generally James Fishkin, Deliberation by the People Themselves: Entry Points
for the Public Voice, 12 Election L.J. 490, 490, (2014) (arguing that the “evaluation and/or
selection of candidates in the nomination phase” is a way in which the people themselves
practice deliberative democracy).
268
To the extent that the Court has determined that Article I, § 2 is an exclusive
delegation to the states of the authority to set voter qualifications for state and federal
elections, then the popular sovereignty principle is also a constraint on state authority in
this area. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona. However, the effect on federal
power is much more limited because there are no “voters” created by federal law, per se,
and there are federalism considerations that may impact the constitutionality of state action
as it relates to federal elections. See Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty. This part of
the argument focuses exclusively on election administration and ballot access, not other
regulations that implicate the right to vote but might arguably be considered “manner”
regulations under the Elections Clause, like redistricting and reapportionment, that
Congress can preempt at will. See, e.g., Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a
Safeguard of Federalism. Even though election administration and ballot access
regulations implicate different constitutional values, see Daniel P. Tokaji, Response:
Judicial Review of Election Administration, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 379 (2008),
both impact the voter’s ability to participate in elections, subject to minimal federal
oversight, and therefore demand some consideration of the popular sovereignty principle.
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Thornton involved an Arkansas state constitutional amendment that sought to
impose term limits on individuals elected to the U.S. House of Representatives and
Senate. 269 The U.S. Constitution contains age, citizenship and residency
requirements for those offices, but says nothing about term limits.270 Thornton
relies on the text of the Qualifications Clauses in drawing a distinction between the
powers given the new central government and those retained by the sovereign
states over congressional qualifications, inferring that these provisions are
exclusive and cannot be supplemented by the states.271 By looking at the text of
the Tenth Amendment as well as the convention and ratification debates, the Court
determined that the power to add qualifications of the House or the Senate was not
within the power reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment because the
states did not possess this authority prior to the ratification of the Constitution.272
The text of the Tenth Amendment similarly draws a distinction between the
powers retained by the people and those of the states, suggesting that these two
categories are not necessarily coterminous; the Ninth Amendment likewise
protects the authority of the people to define the scope of this power through
majoritarian processes.273 The historical analysis illustrates that voters enjoyed
greater rights of participation at the state level; applying a Thorton-esque retained
rights analysis means that these rights followed them into the union. This
preexisting level of participation is the framework from which we adjudge the
constitutionality of current regulations. Judges are equipped to perform this
assessment, as it is very similar to the analysis in cases under Section 5 of the
269

514 U.S. 779 (1995).
See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (qualifications for the House); Art. I, § 3, cl. 3
(qualifications for the senate).
271
Thornton, 514 U.S. at 801.
272
The Ninth and Tenth Amendments also may protect less traditional rights of
participation, at least to the extent that these rights are parallel to those that existed at the
Founding. For example, one such right might be the idea that people could have a
constitutionally cognizable interest in participating in ballot initiatives and referendum at
the state level, traceable to the power delegated to the people by early state constitutions.
See, e.g., The Constitution of Pennsylvania 1776, Art. III, available at
http://www.wordservice.org/State%20Constitutions/usa1021.htm (“That the people of this
State have the sole, exclusive and inherent right of governing and regulating the internal
police of the same.”). Id. at Art. IV (“That all power being originally inherent in, and
consequently derived from, the people; therefore all officers of government, whether
legislative or executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to
them.”). See also The Constitution of North Carolina 1776, Art. II, available at
http://www.wordservice.org/State%20Constitutions/usa1022.htm (“That the people of this
State ought to have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the internal government and
police thereof.”).
273
Lash
270
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Voting Rights Act, where courts determine whether minorities are worse off by
comparing the proposed change to the current law in order determine if the new
rule is “retrogressive.”274 The analysis here is a bit broader—it looks at the level
of participation that the people in the state had historically—in determining
whether the new rule makes them worse off. Similar to section 5, however, such
burdens can be justified if the state is trying to address a problem in its electoral
system, or comply with federal law.275 These rights of participation are articulated
through the right to vote, a value that can be captured in modern doctrine by 1)
viewing the proposed law in the broader historical context of the state’s electoral
apparatus to determine whether the people have a reliance interest in the status
quo, and 2) comparing the state’s prior law to the proposed change and assessing
whether voters are worse off under the new regime. I take each of them in turn.

A. The Foundations of the Reliance Interest: Restrictive Ballot Access
Laws as Infringements of the Popular Sovereignty Principle
Ballot access laws, which are inextricably tied to the right to vote, are instructive
of the reliance interest since the Court utilizes the same framework to assess both
ballot access laws and restrictions on the right to vote. Moreover, the question of
whether ballot access regulations are “restrictive” often turns on an assessment of
the state’s electoral structure as a whole, an analysis that is key to determining the
reliance interests people have developed relative to participating in their respective
state electoral systems.276
In Bullock v. Carter, the Court invalidated the filing fees imposed by Texas to run
as a candidate for certain offices. Some of these fees ranged as high as $8,900, and
had an appreciable effect on exercise of the ballot, even though there were other
avenues available to candidates to get on the ballot that did not require the payment

274

See, e.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140-41 (1976) (“the purpose of
section 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that
would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise”); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 479
(2003) (“any assessment of the retrogression of a minority group’s effective exercise of the
franchise depends on an examination of all of the relevant circumstances, such as the
ability of minority voters to elect their candidate of choice, the extent of the minority
group’s opportunity to participate in the political process, and the feasibility of creating a
nonretrogressive plan.”).
275
See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (assuming without deciding that racial
gerrymanders that otherwise violate the Constitution could be justified in order to comply
with sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
276
See Anderson v. Celebrezze; Crawford v. Marion County
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of a filing fee.277 Notably, the Court did not view ballot access laws as imposing
the same burden on the right to vote as it did on the candidate’s ability to get on the
ballot.278 Nevertheless, the Court recognized that “the rights of voters and the
rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation” so the Court chose
to assess the impact of the ballot access laws on the exercise of the franchise,
consistent with the rigorous analysis commanded by Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections.279
Burdick v. Takushi represented a departure from this approach, both doctrinally
and theoretically. The petitioner wanted to write in Donald Duck as his candidate
of choice for a congressional election, but was barred from doing so by state
law.280 Rejecting the argument that the petitioner had a First Amendment right to
write in his preferred candidate, the Court found that state law provided myriad
opportunity for the petitioner to get his preferred candidate on the ballot. The idea
that the petitioner’s voting related harm can be vindicated by running his own
candidate is a reflection of Founding era views that there should be space between
the voter and the government; the ability of the voter to use the ballot as a place for
dissent runs counter to this impulse. Burdick reaffirmed the connection between
ballot access and voting, but did so in order to reinforce a fairly restrictive view of
the right to vote.281
The contrast between the framers’ view of governance by elites and the democracy
that persisted at the state level highlights a significant flaw in Burdick: the Court
has interpreted the states’ authority over both ballot access and voting from the
277

Id. (rejecting the State’s argument that “a candidate can gain a place on the ballot in
the general election without payment of fees by submitting a proper application
accompanied by a voter petition” on the grounds that it forces the candidate to bypass the
primary election which “may be more crucial than the general election in certain parts of
Texas”). See also Lubin v. Panish
278
405 U.S. 134 (1972) (applying the Harper standard for review of ballot access
laws).
279
Id.
280
See also Harper (avoiding the question of whether there is a first amendment right
to vote in state elections, but grounding the right to vote in federal elections in conceptions
of equal protection). But see Part IV (arguing that the popular sovereignty principle
influences federal elections because of the link in Article I, Section 2 for voter
qualifications in both state and federal elections).
281
See Richard Pildes and Samuel Issacharoff. Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643, 669 (1998) (“For the most part, ballot
access restrictions represent a problem of legislative, rather than intertemporal,
entrenchment. There is little reason to suppose that most voters wish to foreclose the
option of expressing discontent with the traditional political parties by supporting an
occasional third party or independent challenger.”).
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perspective of the representative government that exists at the federal level, with
its initial reservations about access to the ballot, rather than from the baseline of
the democratizing impulse and broad access to the franchise that has historically
permeated the electoral systems of most states since the 1850s (but as early as the
1770s).282 Because the constitutional text links the voter qualifications of state and
federal elections, placing the onus on the states to decide who can vote, this is a
significant oversight.
Consideration of the popular sovereignty principle also validates criticism offered
by Professors Pildes and Issacharoff, that the Court did not properly consider the
write in ban n the broader scheme of Hawaii’s electoral apparatus, but this same
consideration does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that these scholars
advocate: that the write-in ban impermissibly burdened the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of the voter. 283 Pildes and Issacharoff’s argument that
anticompetitive state action in the electoral arena is constitutionally problematic
implies that the state has an affirmative obligation to ensure that its electoral
apparatus is competitive.284 This claim can be constitutionally grounded in the
popular sovereignty principle, at least to the extent that a competitive electoral
structure is historically justifiable, or alternatively, was an aspect of the electoral
structure in the state prior to the adoption of the contested rule,285 yet this does not
282

I recognize that women and minorities could not vote in the 1850s, and democracy
at the time was viewed as extending the vote to nonfreeholding white males and, in some
cases, noncitizens, Keyssar, but “democracy” should be read in light of our evolving
constitutional tradition in favor of universal access to the ballot. See U.S. Const. amends.
XIV; XV; IXX; XXIV; XXVI. See also Reva Siegel, She the People: the Nineteenth
Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002)
(arguing that the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments have to be read together despite
section 2 of the Fourteenth’s language prohibition of abridgments on the right of males to
vote).
283
See id. at 672-73 (criticizing the Court for applying “conventional individual-rights
analysis” “Burdick represents a contemporary variant of Nixon v. Herndon. In each case, a
singularly powerful political party used its control over the state electoral machinery to
devise rules of engagement that prevented internal defection.”) But see Christopher
Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations and
Opportunities, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 313, 353 (arguing that this criticism “goes too far”
because it “was the petitioner who framed the case in ‘narrow, individualistic, nonsystemic
terms”).
284
285

In other words, it depends on whether a state explicitly has embraced a democratic
structure. See generally Fishkin, supra note , at 493 (“[D]emocracy is not about collective
will formation but just a ‘competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ to use Schumpeter’s
famous phrase. Legal guarantees, particularly constitutional ones, are designed to protect
against tyranny of the majority. Within that constraint, all we need are competitive
elections.”) (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY
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necessarily seem to be true of Hawaii. There is no history of write in voting in the
time before or since Hawaii became a state. The write-in ban litigated in Burdick
had been in place in Hawaii since the 1890s, suggesting that the state has,
historically, been less democratic than others.286 After Congress annexed the
islands in in 1898, Congress created a territorial government that had an elected
legislature but an appointed governor. In addition, Congress retained the right to
veto territorial legislation, a right that it never used, but nonetheless, undermined
the notion that Hawaii was overly “democratic” prior to its admission as the fiftieth
state in 1959.287 More recently, while certain counties have a limited initiative
process, giving voters more direct control over policy, but there is no statewide
process for ballot initiatives and referendum.288 Thus, on balance, voters have no
reliance interest that would justify the claim that they are entitled to write-in a
candidate for state elections, as Hawaii has never been a bastion of democratic
participation either historically or with respect to this particular issue.
In contrast, the ban on fusion candidacies in Minnesota, which has history of being
solicitous to third parties, is significantly more problematic.289 In Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party, the Court held that prohibiting fusion candidacies, where
individuals appear on the ballot as the candidate of more than one party, did not
violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the third parties because the
ballot is not “fora for political expression.”290 Like Burdick, the Court ignored the
(1942)).
286
287

JOHN S. WHITEHEAD, COMPLETING THE UNION: ALASKA, HAWAI’I, AND THE
BATTLE FOR STATEHOOD 16 (2004).
288
http://ballotpedia.org/History_of_Initiative_%26_Referendum_in_Hawaii
289
See also Pildes and Issacharoff, supra note , at 683 (“The fusion strategy for third
parties had its heyday at the end of the nineteenth century, particularly in the Midwest
where Populists, Greenbackers, and other lesser groups used coalitions with the Democrats,
the weaker of the major parties, to provide a viable electoral forum for their views. 152 To
a lesser extent, Republicans in the South also used fusion candidacies. 153 The movement
to ban fusion candidacies emerged as a deliberate tactic to eliminate third-party
competition by locking into place the two-party structure. 154 While the antifusion
movement in the Midwest worked to end effective cooperation between Democrats and
third-party groups, it received support from both the Republican and Democratic Parties.
155 Both parties stood to gain from erecting barriers against third-party agitation and
channeling political activity within their own internal institutional frameworks. In the
aftermath of the new barriers to fusion politics, the presence of third parties dramatically
dwindled in contemporary politics.”).
290
Id. at 683 (“This significant electoral strategy allows third parties to influence the
positions taken by the two established parties. Cross-endorsement not only gives third
parties a chance to support a candidate who might get elected, it can also give organized
expression to dissenting voices within the major parties. Fusion candidacies thus influence
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independent constitutional significance of voting and the ballot itself by focusing
on the other avenues in which the interests of the petitioners can be vindicated. 291
Pildes and Issacharoff have criticized the Court’s approach, arguing that the ban
should trigger exacting judicial scrutiny because it “further entrench[es] the two
dominant parties by dramatically raising additional barriers to competition. As a
result of the ban on fusion strategies, third parties seeking to participate
meaningfully in government must organize a party capable of displacing one of the
major parties, rather than influencing one of them.”292
This criticism of the ban is legitimate, not because it is anti-competitive as such,
but because competition has been a legitimate feature of Minnesota politics since
the post-Civil War era. In the years following the War, there was robust
competition for the votes of African-American because the state extended suffrage
to this group in 1867, two years before the adoption of the Fifteenth
Amendment.293 A shortage of workers in its railroad, lumber, and wheat industries
led Minnesota to solicit recent immigrants, and this cultural diversity contributed
to its political diversity. 294 In 1898, Minnesota voters elected a Swedish-born
governor, John Lind, who ran with the endorsements of the Democrats, Silver
Republicans, and Populists, displacing the Republican Party that had dominated
the governorship since before the Civil War. 295 The year 1918 marked the first
time that the Farmer-Labor party appeared on the Minnesota ballot, and the party
enjoyed some success in electing national candidates and competing for the
governorship over the ensuing decades. In 1923, Minnesota’s two U.S. Senators
were members of the Farmer-Labor party. 296 Similarly, in 1930 and 1954,
respectively, Minnesota elected Farmer-Labor candidates to serve as governor,
illustrating the vitality and staying power of third parties in the state. 297
Republican Party dominance in Minnesota from 1939-1955 led to more fusion
candidacies between the Farmer-Labor Party and the Democratic Party, until the
two parties officially merged in 1944. 298 Recently, the DFL has been fairly
the direction of a dominant party's platform or choice of candidates.”).
291
See Joseph Fishkin, Voting as a Positive Right: A Reply to Flanders, 28 Alaska L.
Rev. 29, 37-38 (2011) (arguing that voting is an affirmative right that requires the court “to
take into account the different circumstances that voters face”).
292
Id.
293
THEODORE C. BLEGEN, MINNESOTA: A HISTORY OF THE STATE 289 (1975).
294
Id. at 304-313. See also id. at 473 (noting that, by the first world war, Minnesota’s
population was 70% immigrant or the children of immigrants).
295
Id. at 433.
296
Id. at 477-78 (noting that “Farmer-Labor strength was threatening the Republican
control of the state”).
297
Id. at 523.
298
http://www.dfl.org/about-our-party/overview-dfl-history/
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successful, electing Rudy Perpich in the 1980s, the longest serving governor of
Minnesota, and Paul Wellstone, who served as a U.S. Senator from 1991-2002.299
Given this history, what does popular sovereignty principle have to say about the
standard of review that the court employs to assess the ban? It suggests that the
Eighth Circuit’s resolution of the fusion ban, in light of the historical importance
of third parties, may have been a better approach to resolving its constitutionality
than the approach taken by the Court in Timmons.300 While the fusion ban had
been in place since 1900, the Democratic and Farmer-Labor parties had been
unofficially aligned for almost a decade before their merger in the 1940s,
suggesting that the ban had very little practical application until recently.301 On
balance, the presence of very robust and enduring third parties in the state,
particularly one that successfully combined with one of the two major parties,
suggests that the Court’s concerns about political instability were unfounded.
Moreover, the ban, which was more about stifling competition and furthering a two
party system than any concern that third parties would use the ballot as a vehicle
for promoting “popular slogans and catchphrases,” was completely incompatible
with the state’s progressive political history.
The different political systems of Hawaii and Minnesota indicate balancing may be
more appropriate to assess the restrictions because the test does not obscure the
inquiry into the legitimacy of the voter’s interest, as strict scrutiny would in this
circumstance by calling every state regulation of the right to vote into question.302
Instead, the popular sovereignty principle would require that courts meaningfully
assess the interests on both sides, rather than employ absolute deference to the state
interest which is how balancing has played out in recent cases. State courts have
proven that they can employ this measured and reasoned analysis to their own state
299

Id. at 577. See also id. at 588 (noting that, in 1962, Democratic-Farmer-Labor
candidates won three state offices, including Walter Mondale, who served as vice president
under Jimmy Carter and would later run for president in 1984). See also WILLIAM E. LASS,
MINNESOTA: A HISTORY 280 (1998) (discussing the DFL politicians who have served in
important national positions including Hubert H. Humphrey, who was vice president under
Lyndon B. Johnson; Eugene McCarthy, who served as a U.S. Senator; and Coya G.
Knutson, a congresswoman who served from 1954-58). Id. at 299-300.
300
301

Blegin, supra note , at 525 (noting that the Olson, the Farmer-Labor governor of
Minnesota during the depression, made “no overt effort to unite Farmer-Laborites and
Democrats, but he did not hid his friendly feeling for Roosevelt and the emerging New
Deal”).
302
See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972), quoted with approval in
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983) (noting that “it is essential to examine in
a realistic light the nature [322] and extent … of [the] impact [of ballot-access
restrictions] on voters.”).

DRAFT --NOT FOR CIRCULATION OR DISTRIBUTION

59

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY FOUNDATIONS

2/17/2014 7:11 PM

[Vol. __:_

constitutional provisions regulating the right to vote. In Miller v. Treadwell, the
Alaska Supreme Court held that voters who misspelled the name of write-in U.S.
Senate candidate, Lisa Murkowski, should have their ballots counted because the
court has a “strong and consistently applied policy of interpreting statutes in order
to effectuate voter intent.”303 Notably, these write-in ballots were responsible for
Murkowski’s win in the Alaska Senate race in 2010, and it is not surprising that, in
addition to Alaska’s history of political inclusion,304 the court gave considerable
weight to both the expressive harm of discarding the ballots as well as its
protective democracy foundations,305 noting that state law is “is designed to ensure
that ballots are counted, not excluded. And this inclusiveness is consistent with the
overarching purpose of an election: ‘to ascertain the public will.’”306
Reconceiving of elections as vehicles for ascertaining the public will, rather than
as mere creatures of the regulatory whims of the state, sheds new light on the
legitimacy of certain state interests. In Burdick, the state claimed that it was trying
to prevent party raiding and unrestrained factionalism, interests that are legitimate
but only if they are actual, rather than hypothetical in light of the burdens placed
on the right to vote. Hawaii’s one party system was designed to freeze out third
parties and independent candidates, making such raiding and factionalism unlikely;
on the other hand, voters had never enjoyed a high level of democratic
participation in Hawaii’s electoral scheme, making it difficult to conceptualize the
ability to cast a write in ballot as integral to their popular sovereignty rights.
While the popular sovereignty principle arguably requires that infringements of the
right to vote address an actual problem, it does so with the assumption that these
burdens infringe on participatory rights that the people had long retained in the
state.307 Minnesota had long enjoyed a political environment in which third parties
303

245 P.3d 867, 869.
Id. at 870 (“Alaskan voters arrive at their polling places with a vast array of
backgrounds and capabilities. Some Alaskans were not raised with English as their first
language. Some Alaskans who speak English do not write it as well. Some Alaskans have
physical or learning disabilities that hinder their ability to write clearly or spell correctly.
Yet none of these issues should take away a voter's right to decide which candidate to elect
to govern. We must construe the statute's language in light of the purpose of preserving a
voter's choice rather than ignoring it.”).
305
Id. at 868-69 (“The right to vote ‘is fundamental to our concept of democratic
government.’ ‘[It] encompasses the [voter's] right to express [the voter's] opinion and is a
way to declare [the voter's] full membership in the political community.’ We articulated
this principle over three decades ago…recognizing the profound importance of citizens'
rights to select their leaders”).
306
Id. at 870.
307
Pildes and Issacharoff, supra note , at 674 (“The State's ability to recite abstract
state interests in political stability, avoidance of factionalism, or prevention of party
304

DRAFT --NOT FOR CIRCULATION OR DISTRIBUTION

60

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY FOUNDATIONS

2/17/2014 7:11 PM

[Vol. __:_

were competitive, a fact that overshadows the legitimacy of the ban, no matter how
longstanding, because the state’s interest in the political stability of the two party
system is contrary to its historical reality. Thus, in weighing the equities under
Burden’s sliding scale scrutiny, one cannot critique the strength of the state interest
without properly considering whether the voters have a reliance interest in the level
of participation that they had prior to the implementation of the offending state
law.308 Of course this interest can be subordinate to the state’s attempt to address a
real problem in its electoral system, but the Court would no longer be able to rely
on abstract generalities such as those offered in Burdick and Timmons to justify the
state laws challenged there. 309 Because of the focus on structure of the state’s
electoral apparatus historically, this analysis also opens the door for a sound
constitutional framework to assess the harm from anticompetitive electoral
structures, a foundation that had been missing up to this point.310

B. Reassessing the Validity of Voter Identification Laws in Light of the
Popular Sovereignty Principle: A Nod to the State’s Prior Regime
Voter qualification requirements predate the union, and like access to the ballot,
have evolved over the past two centuries. For example, the 1843 Constitution of
Rhode Island had extensive qualification requirements for those seeking to vote in
its elections, including age, residency, and registration requirements, and it also
required that individuals be current on their property taxes in order to exercise the
franchise. 311 Other states constitutions, including those written during the
raiding, should hardly obstruct more penetrating judicial analysis of the actual
anticompetitive effects.”).
308
This would be in addition to, not in place of, other factors that courts should look to
in determining whether a regulation burdens the right to vote. See, e.g., Tokaji, supra note
, at 387 (arguing that “courts should attend not merely to the number of voters affected by a
particular practice and the degree to which those voters' participation is burdened, but also
to their skewing effect—that is, the extent to which they are likely to impose a differential
burden on certain classes of voters.”
309
See id. at 387 (arguing that courts must assess whether the state’s justification for
maintaining a particular electoral practice is “real or pretextual”).
310
Compare Issacharoff with Persily
311
The Rhode Island Constitution of 1843, Sec. 2, available at
http://www.wordservice.org/State%20Constitutions/usa1031.htm:
Every male native citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty -one years, who
has had his residence and home in this state two years, and in the town or city in which
he may offer to vote, six months next preceding the time of voting, whose name is
registered pursuant to the act calling the convention to frame this constitution, or shall
be registered in the office of the clerk of such town or city at least seven days before
the time he shall offer to vote, and before the last day of December in the present year ;
and who has paid or shall pay a tax or taxes assessed upon his estate within this state,
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Revolution and revised in the early decades of the Founding, were less specific,
declaring only that all elections “be free” and that all men be able to participate so
long as they have a sufficient interest.312 However, like Rhode Island, it was not
uncommon for many state constitutions to include registration requirements in
additions to restrictions based on age, residency, citizenship and property
ownership in order to exercise the franchise. 313 As Part II shows, these
requirements have loosened considerably over the past two centuries, with most
states eliminating freehold requirements in the eighteenth century and Supreme
Court and constitutional amendment eradicating the poll tax in the 1960s.
Nevertheless, many voter qualification requirements remain, and are assumed to be
constitutional under current precedent.314
Given the state’s authority to impose voter qualifications, most litigation strategies
challenging voter identification laws on constitutional grounds have focused on
equating voter id to other disfavored voter qualification methods—namely, the poll
tax—rather than assessing their validity standing alone.315 In Crawford v. Marion
and within a year of the time of voting, to the amount of one dollar, or who shall
voluntarily pay, at least seven days before the time he shall offer to vote…shall have a
right to vote in the election of all civil officers, and on all questions, in all legally
organized town or ward meetings…
312
See, e.g., The Pennsylvania Constitution 1776; The North Carolina Constitution of
1776.
313
The Constitution of New York 1777, Art. VII, available at
http://www.wordservice.org/State%20Constitutions/usa1032.htm (“That every male
inhabitant of full age, who shall have personally resided within one of the counties of this
State for six months immediately preceding the day of election, shall, at such election, be
entitled to vote for representatives of the said county in assembly; if, during the time
aforesaid, he shall have been a freeholder, possessing a freehold of the value of twenty
pounds, within the said county, or have rented a tenement therein of the yearly value of
forty shillings, and been rated and actually paid taxes to this State.”).
314

See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (rejecting
plaintiffs claim that they had a right to vote because they lived outside of the municipal
boundaries of Tuscaloosa and therefore were not bona fide residents). See also Kramer v.
Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (challenging the requirements that
residents had to own or lease taxable property in the district or be parents of children
enrolled in public school in order to vote in school district elections, but not the age,
citizenship, or residency requirements); Gaunt v. Brown, 341 F.Supp.1187 (S.D. Ohio
1973), aff’d 409 U.S. 809 (1972) (seventeen year olds who would turn eighteen by the
election had no right to vote in primary elections).
315
Indeed, there is an argument that voter identification laws are “manner” regulations
or alternatively, “proof” requirements to verify voter qualifications, rather than voter
qualifications themselves, an argument I explore in The Spectrum of Congressional
Authority over Elections, and has come front in center in the litigation challenging Texas’s
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County, the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to Indiana’s voter
identification law on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not shown that providing
identification was a severe burden on the right to vote.316 To the extent that the
burden on some voters is severe, the Court noted that this burden is mitigated by
the fact that they can cast provisional ballots.317
Crawford does not touch on the issue of whether particular types of voter
identification laws can pose a severe burden. Indiana required state issued photo
identification that the state issued the ids free of charge. Voters who could not
obtain the identification could cast a provisional ballot. 318 In the years since
Crawford validated photo identification requirements, states have gotten more
restrictive in the types of identification that is acceptable for use at the polls, a
factor which may not raise concerns if assessed under the equal protection,
Burdick/Anderson style balancing, but would raise concerns under the popular
sovereignty approach. Under the latter, the prior regime that existed in the state
would be the baseline for determining the level of participation that voters enjoyed
prior to the change, and departures from this baseline would be assessed based on
the problem the law is trying to address. Even if a state did not have a voter
identification law in place prior to its adoption, states are not prohibited from
adopting such a rule if it is designed to address a specific problem. For example,
voter fraud was a prominent feature of the 2004 gubernatorial election in
Washington state, where the election was decided by a 133 vote margin, and the
superior court determined that 1678 illegal votes were cast including by felons,
unregistered, and deceased voters.319 Thus, Washington would be well within its
authority to adopt a voter identification law in light of its documented history of

voter identification law. This does not, however, preclude a successful challenge of a voter
identification
law
on
state
constitutional
grounds.
See,
e.g,,
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/setting-647/file-3490.pdf?cb=a5ec29.
316
553 U.S. 181 (2008).
317
Id. at 199 (2008) (“Because Indiana’s cards are free, the inconvenience of going to
the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, gathering required documents, and posing for a
photograph does not qualify as a substantial burden on most voters’ right to vote, or
represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting. The severity of the
somewhat heavier burden that may be placed on a limited number of persons—e.g., elderly
persons born out of State, who may have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate—is
mitigated by the fact that eligible voters without photo identification may cast provisional
ballots that will be counted if they execute the required affidavit at the circuit court clerk’s
office.”).
318
need more specifics
319
H.R. Rep. No. 109-666, at 7 & n.16 (citing Transcript of Court's Oral Decision,
Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 6, 2005), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/oraldecision.pdf).
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voter fraud. This law would further the state’s interest in election integrity because
the risk of fraud is actual rather than speculative.
In contrast, if the state is worried about the perception of fraud, rather than actual
fraud, in voting, the state can legitimately address this concern through a more
limited voter identification law to mitigate the burdens on the right to vote.320 In
cases dealing with perception rather than actual fraud, the law has to have a
minimal effect on the composition of the electorate relative to the psychic benefits
that the state hopes to derive by having the law in place. Thus, partisan purpose
would be more relevant under the popular sovereignty approach in determining
whether the burden is justified, a factor that was not dispositive in Crawford.321
The popular sovereignty principle would require, for example, that a state come
forward with a nonpartisan justification for its use of only limited forms of IDs and
its refusal to give voters the option of presenting a broader swath of official
identification that would similarly establish their identity.
Arguably, limiting the forms of identification that voters could use would have the
effect of constricting the electorate for reasons that are unrelated to the
advancement of any legitimate state interest.322 Pennsylvania’s law, for example,
allows voters to present identification that has a photo of the voter, conforms to the
voter's name on the rolls, is issued by an acceptable authority (the US government,
PA, a PA city to an employee of that municipality, a PA college, or a PA care
facility), and, with only a few exceptions, is not expired.323 In contrast, Texas law
only allows a handful of identifications in order to vote: “(1) a driver's license or
personal ID card issued by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS); (2) a
license to carry a concealed handgun, also issued by DPS; (3) a U.S. military ID
card; (4) a U.S. citizenship certificate with photograph; or (5) a U.S. passport.”
Texas law provides that acceptable IDs may be expired, but must have expired no
more than 60 days before their attempted use. Voters may get a personal ID card
issued by the state, which does not require the payment of a fee, but does require
multiple other forms of identification that cost money, like a certified copy of a
birth certificate.
Unlike traditional equal protection analysis, in which the partisan motivations of
the legislature would have minimal significance because knowledge of a voter ID
law’s potential disproportionate impact does not equate to discriminatory purpose
320

See, e.g., Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867, 876 (Alaska 2010) (noting that
Alaska’s voter identification requirement can be waived if “the voter is known to the
official”).
321
322
323

See Cox v. Larios. But see Crawford.
Applewhite v. Pennsylvania
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under the current caselaw, 324 the popular sovereignty analysis would take such
motivations into consideration in determining whether the burden on the electorate
is justified.325 This is a function of the duality of the analysis—considering both
the voter’s interest and the state’s interest—rather than deferring entirely to the
state, as has been the Court’s practice for many of the cases in this area. With
respect to Texas’s voter identification law, there is a credible argument that the
types of identifications that voters can be present correlate to the partisan leanings
of the electorate.326 Absent an alternative justification for the pool of acceptable
ids, this aspect of Texas’s law would be unconstitutional under my proposed
approach.
To the extent that the constitutionality of voter ID law turns on the availability of
provisional voting, 327 there are constitutional constraints on a state’s ability to
make provisional voting more difficult. Pennsylvania law has an affidavit option
for voters indigent or otherwise unable to obtain an ID (like religious objectors).
Voters who forget to bring ID to the polls, but cannot swear such an affidavit may
vote provisionally and bring appropriate ID to the county board within 6 days in
person or via fax.328 This law is considerably more permissive than some of the
other states surveyed here, and with the in person or fax option for provisional
voters, it is flexible enough that it allows those who were unable to get an ID prior
to the election have meaningful options for having their vote counted. 329 Like
Pennsylvania, Texas voters must present acceptable ID within six days of casting
the provisional ballot, or the ballot will be discarded, but there is no “fax” option,
making it significantly less flexible than Pennsylvania. Texas’s affidavit option is
324

Crawford; Feeney. Partisanship, unlike race, also is not a suspect class sufficient to
trigger strict scrutiny. See generally Veith.
325
Cf. White v. Regester; Whitcomb v. Chavis (determining discriminatory purpose in
redistricting by reference to a list of factors). See also Franita Tolson, What is
Abridgment? A Critique of Two Section Twos (arguing that discriminatory intent in the
context of voting rights does not mean that actions have to be taken “because of, rather
than in spite of” their effect on a minority group).
326
327

See Crawford
Applewhite v. Pennsylvania challenged Act 18 based on state law and the PA
Constitution. The case began in the Commonwealth Court, appealed to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, and was remanded. The law has been met with several temporary
injunctions, one in which parties stipulated that PA poll workers may ask for ID but voters
need not show it, and poll workers were to tell voters that they would need ID in the
election. Given the nature of the case, the current preliminary injunction modified the
previous one slightly: poll workers are now to tell voters that they will need to comply with
ID requirements at some point in the future.
328

329
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more restrictive than the Pennsylvania law. Voters without acceptable ID may cast
regular ballots upon swearing an affidavit explaining that they have a religious
objection to being photographed or have lost their photo ID in a presidentially- or
gubernatorially-declared natural disaster occurring within 45 days of the
election.330 Given that Texas makes the universe of acceptable IDs much smaller
than other states, its limitations on provisional voting would be constitutionally
problematic because it significantly more burdensome than its prior law (any photo
identification, a utility bill, official mail, a paycheck, or a birth certificate) without
adequate justification.331
Texas aside, states still retain broad authority to implement voter identification
laws, consistent with the popular sovereignty principle. For example, South
Carolina’s R54 requires photo ID for in person voters, in the form of a South
Carolina driver's license, a state motor vehicle office- or county election officeissued ID card, a passport, or a military ID. The law removed the existing fee for
motor vehicle office IDs and provided for a new photo voter registration card
available for no charge at county election offices. Prior to 2011, South Carolina
required a driver’s license or written notification of voter registration from the
county board of election registration, so its voter identification law, while more
stringent, is less problematic than if the prior rule had required voters to simply
affirm their name and address.
In addition, South Carolina’s law contained a “reasonable impediment provision”
more robust than the usual affidavit and provisional ballot option. R54 requires
election officials to count the ballots of voters who presented a previously
acceptable non-photo form of ID and signed affidavits indicating a reason for not
having acceptable identification. When the District Court for the District of
Columbia considered whether R54 should be precleared under section 5 in October
of 2012, the three-judge panel found that the reasonable impediment provision
made R54 flexible enough so that the law would not have the purpose or effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, or have a discriminatory
retrogressive effect.332
330

Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (D.D.C. 2012) vacated and remanded,
133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013). The Attorney General filed suit, challenging Texas’s voter
identification law under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. United States v. Texas,
ELECTION
LAW
AT
MORITZ
(Aug.
27,
3013),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/USv.Texas.php (last visited Jan. 4, 2014).
331
Tx. Stat. § 63.0101.
332
However, since the decision was issued just before the November elections, the
Court granted preclearance for 2013 and not 2012, so that elections officials might have
enough time to properly implement the new IDs and “reasonable impediment provision”
and educate voters about them.
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In contrast, North Carolina’s voter identification law is an amalgamation of all of
the issues that raises red flags under the popular sovereignty analysis: limited
forms of acceptable ids; burdensome provisional voting; a significantly more
democratic baseline in the prior regime; and systemic changes that, in their totality,
arguably have the effect of constricting the relevant electorate. Prior to the
adoption of its omnibus election bill in 2013, North Carolina required voters to
state their name and address, and then sign a poll book.333 The new law—which
requires must be issued by either the state or the federal government, or
alternatively, be military id, is significantly more stringent than the prior rule.
House Bill 589 provides that North Carolina voters must present an unexpired
form of acceptable photo identification such as a passport or ID issued by the US
military or Department of Veterans Affairs, a federally- or North Carolinarecognized tribe, or another state if the voter’s registration falls within 90 days of
the election. If a voter does not possess proper ID on election day, he or she may
vote provisionally and return with an acceptable ID before canvassing to have his
or her provisional ballot counted.334 Applying the popular sovereignty analysis to
North Carolina’s law likely would result in its invalidation given that the law is:
more burdensome than the prior practice; limits the pool of acceptable ids; was
passed for partisan reasons; and requires voters to travel to the county canvassing
board in order to have their provisional ballot counted.335

CONCLUSION
There is no explicit constitutional right to vote in state elections, yet the U.S.
Constitution links suffrage in federal elections to those that exist “for the most
numerous branch of the state government.” The Court has dealt with this strange
turn of events by treating the right to vote in state elections as an equal protection
fundamental right, which has, over time, allowed the Court to be outcome driven
rather than recognizing that the strength of the right depends on the election at
issue. Outside of the unique context of presidential elections, an equal protection
333

N.C. § 163-166.7.
See Currie v. North Carolina, ELECTION LAW AT MORITZ (Aug. 15, 2013),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/CurrieV.NC.php (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
Much like the Section 2 case in Texas, the North Carolina plaintiffs point to state changes
in voting beyond voter ID, like the reduction of early voting days notoriously used by
black, church-going voters, to make the case for discriminatory purpose. The parties seek
relief in the form of enjoining HB 589 from going into effect in 2016 and bailing North
Carolina in to Section 5 coverage under Section 3(c) of the VRA.
335
While the voter identification law does not go into effect until 2016, starting in
2014, the new law also does not count provisional ballots filed by individuals who vote at
the wrong precinct. N.C. § 163-166.11.
334
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conception allows the Court to draw lines in any way that it sees fit, so long as
those harmed can be lumped in an identifiable class of individuals whose interests
are sufficiently strong that their disenfranchisement is constitutionally suspect, yet
it is this view of the right, driven by standards developed in a fairly unorthodox
context—presidential elections—that has inappropriately determined the
substantive contours of the right to vote as it applies to every election. More
important, the standard relieves the Court of the affirmative obligation to decide
what voting requires, and it places the onus on the political branches should the
right to vote ever be retracted. Exacerbating this problem is that state courts have
latched on to the equal protection conception of the right to vote in interpreting
their own state constitutions, but have ignored the popular sovereignty foundations
of the right that survived the Founding.
The equal protection framework obscures that the right to vote is mandatory for
state elections because it is part and parcel of the reserve sovereign authority that
people retain under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Consistent with the natural
law right that the people had to alter or abolish their state governments at the
founding, voting is the predecessor of this authority and now stands as the vehicle
through which the people express their sovereign authority.
Thus, this
Constitution’s delegation to the states of determining the qualifications of electors
also incorporates state level understandings that government is based on consent of
the governed, defined by suffrage as well as the rights of assembly, speech, and
petition, rights that were reserved to the people upon the ratification of the
Constitution. This view of the right to vote as firmly rooted in the reserve rights
principles of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments is more consistent with historical
understandings of the right to vote than its current home in the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a historical framework that requires that
judicial assessments of state regulations that constrict the right to vote be more
rigorous than they had been under the Court’s current approach.

